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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, courts have been increasingly confronted with lawsuits
brought against media defendants for physical injuries allegedly caused by
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speech which they disseminated.' Usually predicated on a theory of negli-
gence, these cases present a wide variety of fact patterns. A television show
instructs a child to blow up a balloon containing a BB pellet; the balloon
explodes, blinding the child in one eye. A teenager emulates a method of
"auto-erotic asphyxiation" depicted in a pornography magazine, and strangles
himself in the process. A radio announcer urges listeners to speed to a site to
claim a prize; those who respond injure others in auto accidents. A newspa-
per reveals the name and address of a rape victim whose assailant is still at-
large; the assailant harasses her. A magazine prints a gun-for-hire advertise-
ment that facilitates a would-be murderer to find his trigger-man to do the
deed for him. A young girl attacks her father with household appliances, emu-
lating the violence she watched on an afternoon cartoon program.
In the above examples, all but the last based on actual cases, 2 the
plaintiffs alleged the injuries to be the direct result of media-disseminated
speech under circumstances where the media obviously did not intend that
such injuries should occur.3 When confronted with these media physical injury
cases, many courts have accepted the argument that the media defendants
deserved First Amendment protection beyond the common law and statutory
defenses normally afforded negligence tort defendants under state law.
However, in part because the fact patterns of the cases defied easy
classification, and in part because First Amendment principles themselves
have often seemed murky, undeveloped or in transition, a consistent and satis-
factory jurisprudence has failed to develop in this area.4 More often than not,
1. The cases discussed include not only (1) those in which physical injuries resulted,
but also (2) those in which injuries resulted in death, leading to "wrongful death" actions and (3)
cases in which no physical injury actually occurred, but the threat thereof created emotional
injury, leading to actions for the negligent or intentional infliction of mental distress.
The defendants in the cases discussed include not only those traditionally understood as
being "media," such as broadcasters and publishers, but also those who originated or distributed
speech of a type that the traditional media would frequently disseminate, such as motion pictures
and sound recordings.
For purposes of brevity, all of these cases will hereinafter be referred to collectively as
"media physical injury cases."
2. The last example is drawn from an episode of the television show, The Simpsons
(Fox Broadcasting Co. 1991).
3. A few of the cases discussed are predicated on a theory of intentional, as opposed
to negligent, tort; that the defendants did intend and desire that the injury should occur. These
cases are included because of their close relationship to the media physical injury cases
predicated on negligence theory, and for purposes of comparison. See discussions infra note
135, and accompanying text. The unified First Amendment approach proposed in this paper is
designed to cover cases where the speech-related injuries are alleged to be either negligently or
intentionally inflicted. See infra Part IV (notes 341-82).
4. The topic has been the subject of scholarly commentary in the past. See, e.g., John
L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to Determine
Media Liability for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine, 10
HASTINGS COMM & ENT.L.J. 969 (1988); Gerald R. Smith, Media Liability for Physical
Injury Resulting from the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193 (1988); E. Barrett
Prettyman, Jr. & Lisa A. Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative Violence, 38 FED.
COMM. L.i. 317 (1987); Jonathan M. Hoffman, From Random House to Mickey Mouse:
Liability for Negligent Publishing and Broadcasting, 21 TORTS & INS. L.i. 65 (1985); Nancy
L. Miller, Media Liability for Injuries that Result from Television Broadcasts to Immature
Audiences, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 377 (1985); Lisa A. Powell, Products Liability and the
First Amendmenht: The Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503 (1984);
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the courts seem to be reaching an appropriate result, but often by following
questionable constitutional logic that may only lead to greater confusion in
future cases. Worse, a court will occasionally reach what seems to be an
unfair result under what it believes to be, perhaps incorrectly, constitutional
compulsion.
This Article seeks to clarify this heterogenous area of the law. It eval-
uates the two major constitutional models which courts have used in the
media physical injury cases - the clear and present danger test of
Brandenburg v. Ohio,5 and the defamation jurisprudence distinguishing speech
which is or is not "of public concern."6 It argues that both models are too
exclusively focused on the content of the speech to make their use conceptu-
ally appropriate in the media physical injury cases; and that, as one conse-
quence thereof, they offer a choice of over-protection or under-protection.
This Article proposes that the more appropriate constitutional focus in these
cases is on the potential contrariness between an important First Amendment
interest, the functional role of the media as the disseminators of ideas and
information to the public, and the principles of common law tortious negli-
gence. 7 It is argued that this potential contrariness should create a presump-
tion in favor of constitutional protection for the media, which could be
outweighed and rebutted by a consideration of various factors which are
identified.8
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I surveys and classifies the
media physical injury cases, describing the fact patterns, the common law
and/or First Amendment analyses employed by the courts, and the results of
the most important cases to date. Part II describes, compares and evaluates
various judicial approaches to the First Amendment issue in the media physi-
cal injury cases, considering the appropriateness of their use in these cases.
Part III argues that the central, unifying theme in these cases is the potential
conflict between common law negligence principles and the constitutionally-
valued, functional role of the media in disseminating ideas and information to
the public. Proceeding from this argument, Part III proposes that a calibrated
balancing test, based on Judge Learned Hand's clear and present danger for-
mula in Dennis v. United States,9 is a preferable, more comprehensive First
Amendment approach to these cases. Finally, Part IV suggests the factors
that should be weighed in such a balancing test, and how such a test might be
structured.
Steven J. Weingarten, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment
Consideration, 93 YALE LJ. 744 (1984); Michael I. Spak, Predictable Harm: Should the
Media Be Liable?, 42 Omio ST. L.J. 671 (1981); Gary L. Urwin, Tort Liability of
Broadcasters for Audience Acts of Imitative Violence, 19 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED
FIELDS L.Q. 314 (1981); Anne K. Hilker, Tort Liability of the Media for Audience Acts of
Violence: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 529 (1979).
5. 395 U.S. 444 (1960), discussed infra note 200, and accompanying text.
6. See discussion infra note 248, and accompanying text.
7. See discussion infra note 329, and accompanying text.
8. See id.
9. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), afj'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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I. THE LEADING MEDIA- PHYSICAL INJURY CASES AND
THEIR CATEGORIZATION1O
Actions for speech-related physical injury and wrongful death brought
against the media and related defendants, usually on common law negligence
theory, can be grouped into four general categories: (1) where the injuries pur-
portedly arose from media speech offering instructions for, thereby implicitly
inviting participation in, an activity that was inherently dangerous; or which
became dangerous because the instructions were erroneous (hereinafter, the
"Instruction Cases"); (2) where the injuries purportedly arose as a conse-
quence of obviously dangerous, reckless, and perhaps even unlawful, conduct
in which the defendants actively encouraged or exhorted the speech recipient
to engage (the "Exhortation Cases"); (3) where the injuries purportedly arose
from violence or from dangerous activity inspired by, but not actively encour-
aged by, the defendants' speech (the "Inspiration Cases"); and (4) where vio-
lence against third-parties was supposedly facilitated by information provided
by media defendants (the "Facilitation Cases"). Some of these general cate-
gories are sub-categorized for purposes of clarification and analysis.
Some of the important cases in this area might arguably be placed in
more than one of these categories, or might even be said to "straddle" two
categories, depending upon how the parties pleaded the cases and how the
courts analyzed the facts. Indeed, while the proposed categories and sub-cat-
egories are conceptually distinguishable, the borderline between the categories
is not that well-defined, and is subject to interpretation in specific cases.
A. The Instruction Cases
While all media-conveyed instructions may be thought of as implied invi-
tations to speech recipients to engage in the activity for which instructions are
offered, the Instruction Cases suggest two different negligence theories for
recovery. Some activities, such as defusing a bomb, are inherently dangerous.
If the instructions on how to defuse a bomb are correct, but an explosion and
injuries nevertheless occur, actions are sometimes brought on the theory that
it was negligent not to have adequately warned of the risks involved; or, that it
was negligent to have ever encouraged so dangerous an activity by offering
instructions to otherwise untrained or unqualified persons (the "Dangerous
Instruction Cases").
On the other hand, some activities which are generally considered
"safe" become dangerous if an incorrect or erroneous instruction is given (the
"Erroneous Instruction Cases").11 Cooking, for example, is not considered a
dangerous activity, but if an erroneous instruction is accidentally given on the
number of days to ferment a fish, food poisoning might result.12 Notably, in
10. For examples of other proposed category structures or terminologies for the media
physical injury cases, see Diamond & Primm, supra note 4, at 973-94; Hilker, supra note 4, at
530-47; Urwin, supra note 4, at 316-18.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1975) ("Negligent
Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm").
12. Cf. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff using
cookbook suffered food poisoning when tasted raw piece of recipe ingredient that was
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Erroneous Instruction Cases involving safe activities, the defendant speaker
may not have recognized the danger. It is of course possible that a case could
correctly combine both theories of negligence: the instructions on how to
defuse a bomb might also be erroneous. More frequently, the two theories are
confounded by the pleadings, if only because failure to give adequate warnings
of a risk which was known or which should have been known might be char-
acterized as an "erroneous instruction."13
Another important distinction drawn in the Instruction Cases is between
those who create the instructions (the "speech originators") and those who
only disseminate or transmit them to the public (the "speech disseminators").
Thus courts, applying common law negligence rules, recognize a distinction
between the authors and the publishers of "how to" instruction books. While
author liability for errors in the contents of books, designs or drawings is not
firmly defined and will depend upon the facts of the case,14publishers are not
held liable for the contents of the works they publish unless the authors are
their own employees for whom they would be liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior (the "Instruction Book Publication Cases"). 15 Plaintiffs'
attempts to extend the principles of strict liability for defective products16 to
the publishers of "how to" instruction books, by analogy to defective aeronau-
tical or nautical maps or charts, 17 have been unsuccessful.' 8 In these cases,
poisonous until cooked; alleged negligence for failure to warn of the danger; book retailer held
not liable).
13. When injuries result from the high-risk activities in the Dangerous Instruction
cases, the complaints will usually throw in for good measure the argument that the instructions
were faulty, or at least not the best available given the risks involved. Conversely, the activities
at issue in the Erroneous Instruction cases usually involve more obvious risks than cooking, and
the complaints stress those dangers as correlative to the duty imposed upon the speaker to have
detected the error.
14. See Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D.Md. 1988); Lewin
v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282,283 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Demuth Development Corp. v. Merck
& Co., Inc. 432 F. Supp. 990, 993 (E.D. N.Y. 1977).
15. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991)
(publisher of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms not liable to plaintiffs who became severely ill
from picking and eating mushrooms in reliance thereon); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F.
Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988) (publisher of nursing textbook not liable to nursing student who
injured herself following directions for self-administration of an enema); Lewin v. McCreight,
655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (publisher of The Complete Metalsmith not liable for
injuries from explosion while following instructions for mixing a mordant); Aim v. Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. 1985) (publisher of The Making of Tools
was not liable to plaintiff injured when tool under construction shattered). Cf. Cardozo, 342 So,
2d 1053 (book retailer not liable for error in cookbook).
16. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1977).
17. See,e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Saloomey
v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
18. See,e.g., Winter, 938 F.2d 1033; Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp.
1216, 1217-18 (D. Md. 1988). See also Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D.
Mich. 1987); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup.Ct. Erie County 1981).
Errors in instruction manuals accompanying products, the manuals being deemed a part
of the products themselves, have led to recoveries for physical injuries on strict liability theory.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 252 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Wichman v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954). Some
commentators have argued, by analogy, that publishers of "how to" instructional books and
other media defendants should at least be subject to liability on negligence principles. See, e.g.,
Diamond & Primm, supra note 4, at 976-77. Cf., e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Employers
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the courts have often cited, in support of the common law rule, First
Amendment concerns that speech would be chilled by imposing too heavy a
burden upon the publishers. 19
Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons,20 a recent Ninth Circuit decision, is Mus-
trative. The two plaintiffs had gone hunting for wild mushrooms, relying on
The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms to determine which mushrooms were safe to
eat. This reference work was written by two British authors and originally
published by a British firm. The defendant, an American book publisher, had
purchased copies of the book from the British publisher, and had distributed
them in the United States without any editing on its part. After cooking and
eating wild mushrooms described in the book, the plaintiffs became critically
ill, both requiring liver transplants. Suing Putnam for products liability, breach
of warranty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and false representa-
tions, the plaintiffs alleged that the book contained erroneous and misleading
information concerning the identification of the most deadly mushroom
species.2 1
In a unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit upheld the federal district
court grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Applying California tort
law, the appeals court declined to analogize the book to aeronautical charts,
and thus declined to impose strict liability 2 2 Products liability law, the court
concluded, focuses on tangible items, whereas "how to use" books represent
"pure thought and expression." 23 The court then rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that Putnam had a duty to investigate the accuracy of books which
it published,2 citing numerous common law precedents to the contrary.25 The
court added that "[w]ere we tempted to create this duty, the gentle tug of the
First Amendment and the values embodied therein would remind us of the
social costs."'26
As in the case of book publishers, the press and the broadcast media
might also not be held liable, under common law negligence rules, for the
"neutral dissemination" of instructions by third-party speech originators,
depending on the circumstances of the case.2 7 In analogous cases, media
Ins. of Warsau, 585 F.Supp. 739 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (vendor's sale of an instruction manual,
along with a power saw from a different company, was the sale of a "produce' under vendor's
insurance policy, so as to require insurer to defend when vendor was sued by vendee for injury
from the power saw, allegedly as the result of inadequate instructions and warnings in the
manual).
19. See, e.g., Winter, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037; DeMuth Development Corp. v. Merck &
Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 993 (E.D. N.Y. 1977); Aim v. Van Nostrand, 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267
(Ill. App. 1985); Cardozo, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57.
20. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 1034.
22. I at 1034-36.
23. Id. at 1036.
24. Id. at 1037.
25. I at 1037, n.8.
26. Id at 1037. The court also declined to impose on the publisher the duty to include
a warning label that "this publisher has not investigated the text and cannot guarantee its
accuracy," inasmuch as no publisher has the duty of guarantor.
27. Cf. Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981),
discussed infra note 31, and accompanying text. In Shannon, defendant Turner Broadcasting
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defendants have not been held liable for carrying advertisements for products
which prove to be dangerous in the hands of certain individuals, or dangerous
as the result of erroneous or incomplete instructions,28 provided that they have
not endorsed the product ("the Media Advertisement Cases"). 29
Thus, current negligence law principles are generally protective of
media defendants who merely disseminate instructions, with the cases sug-
gesting that if the common law did not require this result, the First
Amendment would.30 However, if negligence law is less protective of media
defendants who both originated and disseminated dangerous or erroneous
instructions, they may still be accorded First Amendment protection.
Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon,3 1 a Dangerous Instruction Case, is
illustrative. Defendant Disney was the producer of a "Mickey Mouse Club"
television program that featured a segment on creating your own sound
effects. The young audience was shown how to reproduce the sound of a tire
coming off of an automobile by placing a BB pellet inside of a large round bal-
loon, inflating it, and rotating the pellet inside. An eleven-year-old boy who
basically followed the instructions, 2 was partially blinded when his balloon
burst. He sued Disney, along with the syndicator and the broadcaster of the
program. 33
Corp. was arguably in a similar position to the defendant book publisher in the Winter case, as a
"neutral" disseminator of the instructional speech contained in a television program originated by
another defendant, Walt Disney. However, the Shannon court made no distinction among the
defendants, finding in favor of all of them on the theory that the First Amendment protected the
speech on the basis of its content. Id at 582-83. Query whether, under common law negligence
analysis, a broadcaster's duty to screen independently-produced television programs for
foreseeable risks to the viewing public would be comparable to that of a book publisher.
28. See, e.g., Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App.3d 1119, 241 Cal. Rptr.
101 (1987) (tampons); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (NJ. 1974) (fireworks). Cf. Daniel v.
Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ.Ct. 1987) (faulty financial news report on
computerized database). See also Stewart v. Soldier of Fortune, No. 616074, (Cal. Superior
Ct. Orange Co. April 24, 1991) (Magazine was sued for injuries caused to two children
watching a person build and detonate a bomb pursuant to instructions in a book advertised by the
magazine. The plaintiffs alleged that the instructions in the book were inaccurate or incorrect,
and thus presented a premature risk of explosion. They sought to hold the magazine liable under
theories of strict liability or negligence. The court sustained the magazine's demurrer.). These
cases should be distinguished from the recent "gun-for-hire" cases, where it has been alleged
and found that by accepting advertisements which could have been construed as offering
criminal services, the media have "facilitated" the ensuing crimes, and have been held liable in
negligence to the victims. See discussion infra at note 147 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal.App.2d 680, 81 Cal.Rptr. 519(1969) (liability found where Good Housekeeping Magazine placed its official "Consumer
Guarantee Seal" on a pair of defective shoes which caused serious injury). But see MacKown
v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526 (111. 1937) (no liability for injuries to reader
for injury allegedly resulting from use of a dandruff product recommended in an article). The
decision in McKown was, however, based on privity requirements which may now be
antedated. See, e.g., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (111. 1964).
30. See discussion supra at note 16 and accompanying text.
31. 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981).
32. The boy followed the instructions with variations which the court apparently
deemed immaterial. Id at581.
33.. The syndicator and the broadcaster were SFM Media Services and Turner
Communications, Inc., respectively. Id
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The Supreme Court of Georgia held that although what the defendant
had invited the child to do "posed a foreseeable risk of injury," 34 the First
Amendment nevertheless mandated the grant of summary judgment to the
defendants.3 5 The court found that the instructions offered on the show did
not create a "clear and present danger of personal injury to the plaintiff"36 as
required by Schenck v. United States.37 Notably, the Shannon court appar-
ently assumed that all three defendants were protected by the First
Amendment, making no distinction between Disney, the program originator,
and the broadcaster who transmitted the show to the public.38
B. The Exhortation Cases
This category covers cases in which the media defendant is alleged to
have actively encouraged the speech recipient to engage in dangerous, reck-
less, and perhaps even unlawful activity, to the injury of himself or other par-
ties. The paradigmatic case is Weirum v. RKO General, Inc..39 As part of a
promotional contest, a disc jockey on a rock radio station repeatedly urged
listeners in cars to intercept a fellow disc jockey who was driving around in a
conspicuous car from location to location in the Los Angeles area, giving
away cash to those who reached him first. Two teenagers driving in separate
cars, speeding and jockeying recklessly with each other on a highway in pur-
suit of the disc jockey's vehicle, forced another car to crash into the center
divider of the highway and overturn, killing the driver and sole occupant.
In a wrongful death action brought by the wife and children of the
driver, the radio station was held-liable for wrongful death based on negligence
theory. The Supreme Court of California upheld the jury verdict, believing
that the defendant's exhortations to listeners to enter into and continue the
prize chase had "stimulated" the teenagers' reckless driving which resulted in
the fatal accident! 0 The court specifically rejected the defendant's argument
that the First Amendment should bar recovery,4 1 but without elaborate dis-
cussion or case analysis.4 2
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id. at 582-83.
36. Id. at 583.
37. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). It is unclear why the Shannon court used the Schenck
formulation of this test rather than the formulation in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447(1969), which is generally thought to have superceded Schenck, and which the Shannon court
cited elsewhere in its opinion. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d at 582, n.2. Presumably, the Shannon
court thought that the Brandenburg test was limited to cases closer to it on the facts, and that
Schenck still represented the general principle more appropriate in a tortious negligence case. See
discussion infra at note 200.
38. If Disney's program had failed the "clear and present danger" test, it would havebeen proper for the court to have addressed the question whether the other two defendants, as
"speech transmitters," would be entitled -to additional protection under common law negligence
pnnciples or under the First Amendment.
39. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
40. Id. at 46, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 472. The court simply concluded that "[T]he First Amendment does not
sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act"
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On its facts, Weirum is a case about "instructions," but it would be mis-
leading to classify it as an Instruction Case.4 3 Granted, there is some affinity
between an Exhortation Case like Weirum and a Dangerous Instruction Case
like Shannon. Both categories are about encouragement to participate in
activities which are dangerous and injurious to the speech recipient or to third
parties, or to both. Nevertheless, there are sufficient differences between
Weirum and Shannon to justify categorizing them separately. While offering
instructions on how to engage in a dangerous activity may be viewed as an
implicit invitation to engage in it, there is still a difference between implicit invi-
tation and active encouragement or exhortation, if only one of degree.
Notably, the state high courts apparently considered the defendants in both
cases properly chargeable with negligence; 44 only different attitudes towards
the First Amendment's applicability dictated the different results.
1. Exhortation to Activity Unlawful as well as Dangerous
In an important sub-category of the Exhortation cases, the activity pur-
portedly exhortated by the media defendant was not only dangerous to the
speech recipient or others, but also unlawful.4 5
In S & W Seafoods v. Jacor Broadcasting,46 for example, a radio talk
show host, disparaging a local restaurant, urged his listeners to confront the
owner-manager with rude gestures, and to spit on him.47 Although apparently
none of the listeners actually followed through on this advice,48 the Georgia
appellate court ruled that the owner-manager could sue the radio station and
its talk show host for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 49 The
court reasoned that the owner-manager could have suffered emotional
distress from, inter alia, the threat of physical violence,50 and that, in having
urged criminal assault and breach of the peace, the talk show host's speech
was unprotected by the First Amendment.51
Weirum,52 which differs from S&W Seafoods in that a negligent rather
than an intentional tort was alleged, might also arguably be read as a case of
43. It is certainly not a "true" Erroneous Instruction Case. See discussion supra note
11 and accompanying text. Indeed, we could hypothesize a fanciful variation on the Weirum
fact pattern which would fit that category quite nicely: the disc jockey urged the listeners to
exercise caution in driving, but in telling the listeners how to reach the "moving situs" of the
prize, accidentally instructed them to make a turn onto a one-way street, going in the wrong
direction.
44. See Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 45-46, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72; Shannon, 276 S.E.2d
580, 583.
45. This distinction will have decisive consequences in terms of the application of the
Brandenburg test under the First Amendment (see generally discussion infra at notes 200-42),
and may have some bearing on the court's determination as to whether or not the media
defendant's conduct could be deemed negligent under state law.
46. 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. 1990).
47. Id at 229.
48. Id at 230-31.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 230 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
52. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, discussed supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
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exhortation to activity that was unlawful as well as dangerous. Whether the
activity specifically urged in Weirum was unlawful is, however, debatable.
The radio broadcast continually "exhorted" the listeners to participate in the
contest; and due to the nature of the contest, the court found that this
"stimulated" the reckless conduct by the youthful contestants, 53 which the
radio station should have anticipated.54 There was, however, no explicit
finding that the broadcast had specifically urged unlawful action such as
speeding or other moving vehicle violations, or that the radio station had
intended such a result. Rather, the court held that such consequences should
have been foreseen.55
2. Subliminal Messages: Exhortation to the Subconscious
In some recent cases, plaintiffs have alleged an exhortation to danger-
ous activity directed at the speech recipients' subconscious faculties. 56
McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,57 was an action brought in the California state courts
against the singer, John "Ozzy" Osbourne, his record company, and its dis-
tributors, by the parents of a nineteen-year-old who committed suicide after
listening to Osbourne's music, purportedly under the influence of a specific
song, "Suicide Solution".5 8 One of the plaintiffs' theories 59 was that there
were "masked lyrics" included in a twenty-eight-second instrumental break in
the song, which were sung at extra-fast speed, so as not to be immediately
intelligible, and which specifically urged the listener to take a gun and shoot
himself; what might be described as an exhortation to the subconscious.60
A California appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint, holding that nothing in the music was beyond the First
53. Ia at 46-47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal.Rptr. at 472.
54. Iae at 46, 539 P.2d at 39-40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72.
55. Id. at 46-47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
56. Subliminal communication is generally defined as the projection of messages by
light or sound so quickly or faintly that they are received by the listener below the level of
conscious awareness. See Vance v. Judas Priest 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241, 2244 (Nev.
Dist. Ct., Aug. 23, 1989) (No. 86-5844, 86-3939) (hereinafter Vance 1); Olivia Godkin &
Maureen Ann Phillips, Note, The Subconscious Taken Captive: A Social, Ethical and Legal
Analysis of of Subliminal Communication Technology, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1981).
For an erudite discussion of the history of subliminal communications and government
responses thereto, see Vance I, supra, at 2244-46.
57. 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988).
58. The cases in this sub-category have not to date involved the traditonal media, but an
analogous medium, that of mass-distributed sound recordings. It is not difficult to hypothesize
future cases in which a radio station is sued for having "negligently" broadcasted a sound
recording which purportedly had similar consequences.
59. The plaintiffs' other theory was that the song preached that suicide was the only
way out and was a recommended course of action, which, with the hemisync tones of
Osbourne's music, would obviously influence the emotions and behavior of individuals such as
their son, who, because of their emotional instability, were susceptible to this idea.
60. The McCollum action, as well as the similar case of Vance v. Judas Priest, 1990
WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct., Aug. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Vance 1], discussed infra note 64 and
accompanying text, is thus different from most of the cases under consideration in that the
primary theory of these complaints is that the speaker intended for the harm to happen, and not
that the harm was the result of the speaker's negligence. Nevertheless, a discussion of these
cases is included herein because of their close relationship to the Inspiration Cases, discussed
infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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Amendment's protection, 61 and that in any event there was no intentional or
negligent invasion of the plaintiffs' rights. 62 Subsequently, a federal district
court in Georgia granted Osboure summary judgment in a very similar
wrongful death action, reaching the same conclusion with regards to the First
Amendment.63
In Vance v. Judas Priest,"4 however, a trial judge was more receptive to
a similar claim that teenage suicides had resulted from subliminal messages In
"heavy metal" music recordings. Raymond Belknap, eighteen, and James
Vance, twenty, emotionally-unstable young men with a history of drug and
alcohol abuse, entered into a "suicide pact" and shot themselves with a
sawed-off shotgun after listening to the "Stained Class" album of the British
"heavy metal" group, Judas Priest. Belknap died immediately; Vance,
severely wounded, died three years later. Their families sued Judas Priest,65
CBS Records, and others involved in the production and distribution of Judas
Priest albums, for wrongful death in a Nevada state court.
On defendants' initial motion for summary judgment, the trial judge held
that Judas Priest's music, lyrics, and videos were protected by the First
Amendment,66 but that any subliminal messages in the music, should they be
found to exist,67 would not be.68 The court ruled that subliminal messages
were not First Amendment-protected speech because: (1) such messages do
not advance any theories supporting free speech; 69 (2) the individual has a
First Amendment right to be free from unwanted speech; 70 and (3) hidden
messages should not be forced upon an unknowing and unconsenting audi-
ence.71
61. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94, using the
"incitement" test of Brandenburg discussed infra at note 200 and accompanying text.
62. Id at 1004-07, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 195-98.
63. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F.Supp.1 144 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
64. Vance v. Judas Priest (Vance 1), 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241 (Nev. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 1989), supra note 56; Vance v. Judas Priest (Vance 11), 1990 WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct.,
Aug. 24, 1990), supra note 60.
65. In Judas Priest v. District Court, 760 P.2d 137 (Nev. 1988), the Nevada Supreme
Court upheld the use of the state's long-arm jurisdiction statute to reach Judas Priest and other
British defendants.
66. Vance 1, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241, 2244,2246. The trial court judge did not
elaborate as to why he believed the Judas Priest lyrics would not pass the "incitement" standard
of Brandenburg. The lyrics quoted in the opinion (Id. at 2243) might be interpreted as
endorsing the idea of suicide. However, absent exhortation to the act, it is doubtful that the
lyrics could be construed as incitement to commit suicide, let alone pass the imminency, intent
and likelihood requirements of the Brandenburg test.
67. The defendants always denied that there were subliminal messages in the Judas
Priest albums. Id at 2244.
68. Id. at 2247.
69. Id. at 2247-49. The trial judge described these "major theories" as being the
following: (i) that free speech is necessary for the preservation of the uninhibited marketplace of
ideas ("the most widely-recognized [theory]"); (ii) that free speech is essential to intelligent self-
govenment in a democratic system; and (iii) that free speech promotes individual self-fulfillment
and self-realization. Id. at 2247. For a discussion of these different theories supporting the First
Amendment, see infra note 282.
70. Id, at 2249-51.
71. ld, at 2251-54.
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However, this emphasis on the intentional invasion of privacy ultimately
proved fatal to the plaintiffs' claim. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge
ruled72 that there were indeed subliminal messages in one song, 73 but that they
had been formed accidentally and unknowingly, 74 and without the intent
necessary to hold Judas Priest liable.7" Moreover, the judge ruled that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that such
messages, even if perceived, could be the proximate cause of "conduct of this
magnitude." 76
Although the plaintiffs did not succeed, the opinions in Vance suggest
that a separate jurisprudence of Subliminal Exhortation could possibly emerge,
and that these cases need not necesiarily be viewed as merely pleading, more
aggressively and imaginatively, media-inspired psychological mood-shifts.77
C. The Inspiration Cases
This category of cases is characterized by allegations that the speech
recipient was "inspired" by the media speech to do injury either to himself or
to third parties, albeit the facts of the case would not support a claim that the
media defendant had either exhorted such actions or had invited them by way
of instruction.
Although this would seem to be a weak theory,7 8 plaintiffs have brought
a significant number of cases in this category. Indeed, upon closer
examination, the broad concept of "inspiration" actually embraces a number
of different theories for recovery. The discussion which follows therefore
examines various sub-categories of cases: (1) where the speech recipient
allegedly imitated media-depicted activity (the "Imitation Cases");79 (2) where
the media allegedly induced a psychological mood shift in the speech recipient,
resulting in either depression and suicide, or violence and injury by the speech
recipient to third parties (the "Mood Shift Cases");80 and lastly, (3) where it is
alleged that media depictions attracted violent persons to the situs of the
speech, resulting in injury of third parties (the "Attracted Violence Cases").8'
1. The Imitation Cases
These cases involve the imitation by the speech recipient of violent or
otherwise dangerous acts depicted or described in media communications,
resulting in injury to the speech recipient or to third parties. The Imitation
Cases can be subdivided into cases where the speech recipient intentionally or
accidentally injured themselves, purportedly through imitation of a dangerous
72. Vance II, 1990 WL 130920.
73. Id at 17-18.
74. Id at 18-19.
75. Id at 21-22 & 46-47.
76. Id at 41.
77. See discussion infra note 97 and accompanying text.
78. In no Inspiration Case found has a plaintiff succeeded in winning a final judgment.
79. See discussion infra note 82 and accompanying text.
80. See discussion infra note 97 and accompanying text.
81. See discussion iifra note 122 and accompanying text.
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media-depicted act, and cases where the speech recipient directed the imi-
tated violence against third parties.
Self-injury or suicide by imitation is exemplified by DeFilippo v. National
Broadcasting Co..82 On defendant network's popular late-night comedy and
talk show, "The Tonight Show," a guest, a professional stuntman, demon-
strated a stunt by appearing to "hang" the show's host, Johnny Carson, from a
gallows. The stuntman made some general remarks to the effect that people
should not attempt the stunt.8 3 A thirteen-year-old boy, attempting to imitate
the stunt right in front of his television set, accidentally hung himself with a
noose. The parents sued the network for wrongful death. The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant on the theory that there was no "incitement" as required by the
First Amendment?8
Imitated violence by the speech recipient directed against third parties is
exemplified by Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co..85 The defendant
television network had broadcast nationally at "prime time" a made-for-TV
movie entitled "Born Innocent," which depicted in one scene the "artificial
rape," with a tool called a "plumber's helper" or "plunger," of an adolescent
by fellow "inmates" in a state-run home for girls. Four days after the broad-
cast, the plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl, was attacked and "artificially raped"
with a soft-drink bottle by a group of minors at a San Francisco beach. Her
assailants had viewed and discussed the artificial rape scene in "Born
Innocent," and apparently had decided to imitate it.86 It was alleged that the
film had caused the attack,8 7 and moreover, that the defendant NBC had prior
knowledge of studies on child violence which indicated that susceptible
persons might try to imitate the violent act that NBC later depicted.88 The
California appellate court held that the First Amendment barred the negli-
gence claim, affirming the trial court's grint of a judgment of nonsuit to
defendant.8 9
As illustrated by DeFilippo and Olivia N., what distinguishes the
Imitation Cases from the Instruction and Exhortation Cases is that there is no
assertion that the media speaker impliedly or expressly invited, encouraged or
urged that the speech recipient engage in the violent or dangerous conduct.
Rather, the allegation is that the media speaker should have reasonably known
that such imitation would occur, and therefore should never have depicted the
act, even when accompanied by an express warning to the speech recipients
against imitation.
But for such an express warning against imitation, one significant case
might arguably be better categorized with Shannon as one of Dangerous
82. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
83. Id at 1037-38.
84. Id at 1041-42.
85. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
86. Id. at 493, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id at 495-7, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892-4.
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Instruction, 90 rather than grouped here with DeFilippo as a case of "suicide-
by-imitation." In Herceg v. Hustler,91 a fourteen-year-old boy hung himself to
death while attempting to imitate the practice of "autoerotic asphyxiation" -
masturbation while "hanging" oneself in order to temporarily cut off the blood
supply to the brain at the moment of orgasm 92 - as described in an article in
Hustler Magazine (Hustler). The article described the practice in detail and
the sexual pleasures it supposedly induced, purportedly for "educational"
purposes, 93 but warned the readers some ten different times in two pages of
the dangers of the practice,94 and told them specifically not to attempt it
themselves. 95 A divided Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district
court wrongful death judgment against the magazine, reasoning that the First
Amendment would proscribe liability where there was no "advocacy," let
alone "incitement," to engage in the practice.96
2. The Mood Shift Cases
This sub-category of Inspiration Cases are premised on the theory that
the media speech induced a psychological mood shift in the speech recipient,
causing despondency leading to suicide or self-injury; or, alternatively, causing
aggressive and violent behavior resulting in injury to third parties. Because
the claim of proximate causation on a mood shift theory is so attenuated, and
the chance of recovery so remote, these cases are usually pleaded aggres-
sively so as to assert subliminal exhortation by, or imitation of, the media
speech. There are, nevertheless, a few cases illustrating this sub-category
which are useful in distinguishing the Subliminal Exhortation 97 and Imitation98
Cases previously discussed.
Watters v. TSR, Inc.99 is a good example of a mood-shift suicide case,
although not one involving the media or media-disseminated speech. Rather,
the subject of Watters was a parlor board game, what the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals referred to as "a work of imagination" similar to those to which
the public is exposed by television, movies, magazines and books.100 Watters
was a wrongful death action brought by a mother against the manufacturer of
the game Dungeons and Dragons. She claimed that her son's suicide had
resulted from his obsession with playing the game, in which he was so
90. See discussion supra note 31 and accompanying text.
91. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
92. Id at 1018.
93. Id
94. Id at 1019.
95. Id at 1018.
96. Id. at 1021-24. The Fifth Circuit majority applied the "incitement" test of
Brandenburg, while expressing doubt that the "incitement" required could be found outside of
the context of arousing a crowd to commit criminal action. Id at 1023.
97. See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.98. See discussion supra note 82 and accompanying text.
99. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990).
100. Id at 382. The Sixth Circuit, recognizing the analogy to injury claims brought on
the basis of media depictions of violence or dangerous activities, looked for such precedents
under Kentucky caselaw but failed to find any. Id. The court therefore looked to cases in otherjurisdictions - Zamora, 480 F. Supp. 199; Herceg, 814 U.S. 105; DeFilippo, 446 A.2d
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absorbed that "he lost control of his own independent will and was driven to
self-destruction."101 The federal district court granted the defendant summary
judgment on the grounds that the First Amendment would bar liability.102
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but specifically on the narrower ground that
the plaintiff could not possibly succeed under Kentucky's common law of neg-
ligence: the defendant's game could not be deemed the proximate cause of
the son's decision to commit suicide.1 03 The court of appeals noted that
Dungeons and Dragons, a "let's pretend" game requiring participants to use
their imagination to re-create roles in an imaginary, mythical world, never
encouraged suicide, nor even mentioned it;104 the imaginary world of the game
"does not appear to be a world in which people kill themselves or engage in
acts of wanton cruelty toward other people.' 0 5
The appellate court's conclusions preclude an inference that the suicide
was in imitation of anything seen in the game, thus distinguishing Watters from
DeFilippo,10 6 the paradigmatic suicide-by-imitation case. 0 7 Watters is also
distinguishable from McCollum10 8 and Vance'0 9 in that there was no assertion
in Watters that the game contained subliminal exhortations to commit suicide.
Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System't 0 exemplifies a different type
of Mood Shift case, in which the violence allegedly inspired in the speech
recipient by the medium is directed at third parties. Zamora was an action
brought against all three of the major television networks on the theory that
television violence had caused the fifteen year-old plaintiff to become so
addicted and de-sensitized to violence that he shot and killed his neighbor, an
eighty-three-year-old woman. The federal district court dismissed the com-
plaint for failing to state a cause of action for negligence under Florida law,"I
and additionally, because the First Amendment would bar such an action.' 12
Again, given the unlikelihood of recovery under a theory as attenuated
as that of Zamora, plaintiffs will more likely plead similar claims as "imitation"
of media-depicted violence or, if possible, as "subliminal exhortation."
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,1 3 for example, was a wrongful
death action brought against the company that had -made and distributed the
motion picture, "The Warriors," a work of fiction that portrayed the adven-
tiures of one youth gang being pursued through the subways of New York City
1036; Shannon, 276 SE.2d 580; Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 - all of
which it believed favored the defendants. 904 F.2d at 382-83.
101. 904 F.2d at 380.
102. Watters v. TSR, Inc.,.715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 378(6th Cir. 1990).
103. Walters, 904 F.2d. at 380-84.
104. Id. at 380, 382.
105. Id at 382.
106. DeFilippo, 446 A.2d 1036.
107. See discussion supra note 82, and accompanying text.
108. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d. 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, discussed supra note 57,
and accompanying text.
109. See discussion supra note 64 and accompanying text.
110. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
111. Id at 201-03.
112. Id at 203-07.
113. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
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by other hostile gangs.114 In a series of widely publicized incidents throughout
the nation, adolescents who had viewed this film went on violent rampages
after emerging from the theaters;115 Yakubowicz's sixteen-year-old son was
knifed to death by another young man who had just viewed the film in Boston.
Yakubowicz alleged that Paramount had produced, distributed, and advertised
the motion picture "in such a way as to induce film viewers to commit vio-
lence in imitation of the violence in the film:" 6
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The court noted that the film
'includes numerous scenes of juvenile gang-related violence in which youths
battle with knives, guns, and other weapons," 117 and concluded that the
defendants owed a duty of reasonable care to members of the public, including
the slain Yakubowicz boy, "with respect to the producing, exhibiting and
advertising of movies.1 118 However, the court concluded, perhaps incongru-
ously, that defendants did not violate their duty of reasonable care, because
the First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech guarantees would bar the
action where there was no advocacy or incitement of "unlawful or violent
activity on the part of viewers." 119
Although Yakubowicz was pleaded as an Imitation Case, some differ-
ences from the comparable case in that sub-category, Olivia N., should be
noted. The defendants in Olivia N. had purportedly viewed "Born Innocent,"
and from it had gotten the novel idea120 of committing an "artificial rape."
They carried out the idea several days later. The assailant in Yakubowicz, in
contrast, apparently acted spontaneously under some kind of psychologically
induced mood of frenzied violence triggered by viewing the film. Something
more than the mere imitation of a violent act seems to have occurred - per-
haps a psychological bonding with the beleaguered protagonists of the film
plot. The assailant must have been previously exposed to media depictions of
knife-stabbings on countless occasions where no such violent reactions were
triggered. Thus, although pleaded as an Imitation Case, Yakubowicz is more
appropriately classified as a Mood Shift Case.12'
3. The Attracted Violence Cases
Clearly related to the Inspiration Cases are those cases in which it is
asserted that the defendant should be held responsible for injuries to third-par-
ties when its depictions of violence attract violence-prone people to a situs,
114. Id at 1069.
115. IU
116. Id. at 1068.
117. Id. at 1069.
118. Id at 1070-71.
119. Id at 1071.
120. Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 491-92, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891-92. Notably,
in DeFilippo, 466 A.2d 1036, and Herceg, 814 F.2d. 1017, the two other Imitation Cases
discussed, the speech recipients were also imitating what were to them "nover' activities. See
discussion, supra notes 82 & 91 and accompanying text.
121. Yakubowicz is, however, clearly different than Zamnora, 480 F. Supp. 199, in that
the violence in Yakubowicz was purportedly inspired by one specific motion picture, rather than
by long-term exposure to media-depicted violence in general. 536 NE.2d at 1067.
1992] 247
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
such as to the vicinity of a movie theater. An example of this phenomenon,
was the cinematic opening of the film "Boyz 'N the Hood." According to the
film's distributor, Columbia Pictures, violence broke out at about twenty of the
900 theaters showing the film when it opened on July 14, 1991, leading to thirty-
one injuries and one fatality. 22 Notably, the content of this movie was "an
anti-gang message,"'123 but there was speculation that the violence had
resulted because the movie had attracted rival gangs into close proximity with
each other.124
The paradigmatic case, Bill v. Superior Court of the City and County of
San Francisco,125 was an action brought by a girl and her mother to recover
for injuries that the girl sustained when she was shot while walking down the
street after exiting from a theater showing the movie "Boulevard Nights."
Like "The Warriors," this movie was about urban gangs and contained depic-
tions of violence. The plaintiffs' theory was that defendants, the producers of
the film, should have realized that the violent nature of the movie would attract
violence-prone people to the vicinity of the theaters, and should have taken
security precautions that would have protected the victim. 126 The California
appellate court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to grant
the defendants summary judgment on First Amendment grounds. 27
Notably, the plaintiffs in Bill never alleged that the assailant had viewed
"Boulevard Nights," perhaps because he had never been identified and an
assertion was therefore not provable. Indeed, the plaintiffs argued that it was
irrelevant whether the assailant had in fact viewed the film, if the general
subject of the film had lured this violent person to the vicinity of the theater.
Plaintiffs thus argued that judgment in their favor would not infringe upon the
First Amendment, since it would not burden the film on the basis of its specific
content. 128 The state appellate court, however, noted a flaw in the plaintiffs'
logic: the argument that the film attracted violence-prone people to the the-
ater's vicinity because of its violent nature was precisely focused on the film's
content. 129
122. Richard W. Stevenson, An Anti-Gang Movie Opens to Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 1991, at 10, col. 2. As of this date, at least one lawsuit has been filed against Columbia
Pictures and an exhibiter. See Phillips v. Syufy Enterprises, No. C92-01287 (Sup. Ct. Contra
Costa County, Calif., March 17, 1992).
123. Id.
124. Id:
125. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1982).
126. Id at 1005, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
127. Id at 1015, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
128. Id at 1007, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
129. Id at 1005, 187 Cal Rptr. at 627. Given the gravamen of the complaint, one might
have imagined that the plaintiffs' claim would have focused more on the content of the
promotional advertising of the film. However, according to the appellate court, "[pilaintiffs do
not suggest, ... and there was no evidence, that the trailers or the advertisements themselves
contributed to the danger of violence at theaters where the movie was shown." Id Rather, the
complaint seemed to suggest that public awareness of the nature of the plot might have been
fostered by press accounts linking "Boulevard Nights" with "The Warriors" (which had opened
earlier) as both being "gang movies." The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had been aware
of such press linkage and had considered taking security measures at the theaters, but had failed
to do so. Id at 1005-06, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
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Bill thus represents an unsuccessful attempt by plaintiffs to place an
Inspiration Case into a line of jurisprudence recognizing the duty of event-
promoters to provide reasonable security measures. 130 If the shooting had
occurred within the movie theater lobby or auditorium, the plaintiffs might
have had a stronger argument. In most instances, however, the Attracted
Violence cases are about "inspiration," whether that inspiration is drawn from
the specific content of the speech or from its general subject matter.
D. The Facilitation Cases
This category encompasses cases in which it is alleged that the media
provided information to the speech recipients which the latter needed and
used, directly or indirectly, in inflicting injury or death upon third parties. Thus,
it is argued that the media defendant "facilitated" the commission of the tort or
crime. The cases which have appeared to date are of two very different
types. One sub-category of cases involves the revelation of information about
a crime victim or crime witness where the crime suspect is still at-large and
perhaps unknown (the "Endangering Revelation Cases"). A second sub-cat-
egory of cases involves "gun-for-hire" or similar advertisements which facili-
tated the making of contacts for, and contracts of, "crime-for-hire" (the
"Criminal Advertisement Cases").
1. The Endangering Revelation Cases
In Hyde v. City of Columbia,"'1 the plaintiff, Ms. Hyde, had reported to
the Columbia, Missouri police that she been the victim of an abduction and
assault. Ms. Hyde alleged that she had been accosted while walking home
after midnight by a male stranger in his late twenties. He allegedly opened the
door of his red Mustang automobile, levelled a sawed-off shotgun at her, and
ordered her into the car. When she was inside, he threatened to blow her
head off if she did not do as he said. As the abductor began to start up the
car, the plaintiff jumped out of the car. The abductor clung to her dress, but it
tore, allowing the plaintiff to escape. A full report of the crime was made to
the city police. The police released the details of the crime, as well as the
plaintiff's name and address, without her permission, to reporters for two local
newspapers. After both newspapers published this information, the plaintiff
reported seven separate incidents in which her assailant tried to terrorize her
in person or over the telephone.
Ms. Hyde sued the City of Columbia for the "negligent disclosure" of
her name and address by the city police, and the two newspapers and their
reporters for their "negligent publication" of that information. 132 The trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the allegations
of the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
130. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 578,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (promoter of a cross-country motorcycle race liable for negligent
safety measures). See generally Diamond & Primm, supra note 4, at 983-89 (arguing that both
Bill and Weirum should have been treated as "media-sponsored events," and analyzed under
traditional negligence principles rather than the First Amendment).
131. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1982).
132. MdE at 253.
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The Missouri appellate court reversed and remanded. 133 " Finding that
the information was not a "public record" under the state's Sunshine Law,134
the court held that the averments stated a cause of action for negligence
under Missouri common law principles.1 35 The court rejected the
newspapers' and reporters' defense that the publication was protected
because the information was "newsworthy." The court noted that while this
defense might be available in other areas of tort law, such as invasion of pri-
vacy, outrageous conduct and defamation, it was not available as a defense in
a negligence action.1 36  Moreover, the court concluded that the First
Amendment's requirements protecting publications on "matters of public con-
cern" were here satisfied because the complaint sounded in negligence rather
than strict liability, 137 in conformance with its reading of the Supreme Court's
holding in the defamation case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 138
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (Doe)139 is an Endangering
Revelation Case reminiscent of Hyde, but with some important differences.
The anonymous plaintiff in Times Mirror, "Jane Doe," was a murder witness:
entering her apartment late one night, she found lying on the floor the nude
body of her roommate, Rose Rende, who had been raped, beaten and stran-
gled. A man was still standing over the victim. Jane Doe looked at him, fled
the apartment, and found a police officer. A summer intern working at the
Times Mirror, hearing about the crime on the radio, phoned the coroner's
office and purportedly obtained Jane Doe's name from an unidentified individ-
ual there.140 The next morning, the Times Mirror published an account of the
Rende murder, mentioning Doe by name as the discoverer of the body. Doe
sued the newspaper and its intern reporter for invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 141
A divided California appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to
grant summary judgment to the defendants. 42 Citing Hyde as relevant
authority, the Times Mirror court held that where the suspected murderer was
still at-large, the First Amendment did not provide absolute protection from
liability for printing the witness' name.1 43 The court concluded that although
the fact of the murder and the name of the victim may have been
133. Id at.273.
134. Id at 258-64.
135. Id. at 258, 272-73. The court noted that Missouri law "imposes liability in
negligence for an intentional injury where the original actor creates a condition which he knows
or should foresee will give occasion to a third person to commit an intentional injury upon the
plaintiff." Id. at 272 (citing Missouri cases as well as RESTATERW (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
302B, 449 (1965)).
136. 637 S.W.2d at 264. The appellate court specifically rejected the defendants'
attempt to characterize the plaintiffs' suit as one for invasion of privacy or outrageous conduct.
Id. at 255.
137. Id at 264-67.
138. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed infra note 270, and accompanying text.
139. 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420,244 CaL Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed,
489 U.S. 1094 (1989).
140. The trial court apparently considered the question of how the Times Mirror
obtained the information to be a triable issue of fact. Id at 1429,244 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
141. Id at 1424,244 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
142. Id at 1433, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
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"newsworthy" for purposes of common law immunity, whether or not the
name of the witness was "newsworthy" was a question for the jury.144
Moreover, the defendants' asserted First Amendment right to publish
"lawfully obtained truthful information" was deemed to be "overcome!' by the
state's interest in protecting witnesses and pursuing criminal investigations. 145
Although the Hyde and Times Mirror cases are very similar in their fact
patterns and holdings, some differences are worth noting. Ms. Hyde alleged
specific acts by the suspect-at-large which would have established that he.had
indeed been a speech recipient whose actions had been "facilitated" by the
press. Jane Doe, on the other hand, did not allege any specific acts of terror-
ization or other injury by the suspect-at-large; she alleged only the terror that
she reasonably felt on the assumption that such "facilitation" by the press
might have occurred. The absence of specific acts of terrorization was not an
impediment to plaintiff's successfully pleading the cause of action for
"negligent infliction of emotional distress" in Times Mirror, and the California
court seems correct in having treated that difference from Hyde as inconse-
quential.
A more significant difference in the analyses in these two cases resulted
from the fact that Jane Doe apparently made her primary claim "the invasion
of privacy," a cause of action which Ms. Hyde did not plead at all. In conse-
quence, both the majority and the dissent in Times Mirror focused almost
exclusively on the common law and First Amendment dimensions of the tort
of "privacy invasion" rather than on the tort of "negligent infliction of
emotional distress."'146
2. The Criminal Advertisement Cases
In these cases, advertisements in the media are used to establish con-
tacts and contracts between those who want to have others commit crimes
for them (the "criminal principals") and those who are willing to commit those
crimes for pay (the "criminal agents"). In theory, either the criminal principals
or the criminal agents could place the advertisements, but in the three major
cases that have arisen in this category, it was the criminal agents who placed
the ads, specifically, in one magazine, Soldier of Fortune.147
Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,148 was a wrongful death
action brought by the mother and son of a murder victim. Sandra Black was
shot and killed by John Wayne Hearn, who had been offered $10,000 by
Sandra's husband, Robert, to murder her. Robert Black had contacted Hearn
through an ad which Hearn had placed in Soldier of Fortune magazine (SOF).
143. Id at 1426, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
144. Id at 1428-29,244 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62.
145. Id at 1432,244 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
146. For an argument that the Times Mirror court's focus on the privacy invasion claim
was incorrect and misleading, see discussion, infra note 237 and accompanying text.
147. Under the general rules set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), there is no First Amendment protection
for speech that advertises unlawful services or products. None of the ads in the three cases
herein discussed explicitly mentioned unlawful services, but the results turned largely on
whether the courts felt that as much was implied.
148. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
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In the ad, Hearn had described himself as an ex-Marine, Vietnam veteran, and
weapons specialist, with experience as a pilot and he offered his services for
"high risk assignments, U.S. or overseas."'149 Robert Black's initial inquiry to
Hearn was about a lawful activity - serving as a bodyguard - and Black
later met Hearn personally to view and admire his gun collection. Only later
did Black proposition and obtain Hearn's services for uxoricide.
The Eimann plaintiffs won a verdict for a sizeable judgment in a jury
trial held in the federal district court in Houston, 15o and judgment was entered
upon the verdict. 151 By a series of special interrogatories, the jury found: (1)
that Hearn's ad was "related to" an illegal activity; (2) that SOF knew or
should have known "from the face or the context of the Hearn advertisement
that the advertisement could reasonably be interpreted as an offer to engage
in illegal activity"; (3) that SOF's negligence was the proximate cause of
Sandra Black's death; and (4) that SOF's negligence constituted "gross
negligence," defined as "conscious indifference."152
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment in favor of
SOF. 53 The Court of Appeals avoided ruling on SOF's First Amendment
defense, 54 holding instead that SOF could not be deemed liable under Texas
negligence law. 155 As the appellate court saw it, Hearn's ad was "facially
innocuous" and at best ambiguous as to whether or not he was offering
unlawful services. 56 Using a "risks/benefits" balancing test,157 the court
concluded that, "[gliven the pervasiveness of advertising in our society and
the important role that it plays," 58 it made no sense to impose on publishers
the obligation to reject all ambiguous advertisements which might pose a risk
of harm. 59
As Eimann illustrates, the Criminal Advertisement Cases may be
conceptually similar to Instruction Cases like the Winter mushroom case, 60
which hold book publishers free of negligence. Media defendants in both cat-
egories have been viewed by courts to be neutral disseminators, not origina-
tors, of the speech that allegedly caused the injury, and therefore not negligent
under common law. It is also notable that the Criminal Advertisement Cases
are, in this regard, quite different from the other sub-category of Facilitation
149. Id at 831.
150. The judgment totalled $9.4 million, consisting of $1.9 million in compensatory
damages and $7.5 million in punitive damages. Id at 830, 833.
151. See also Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.
Tex. 1988), rev'd, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
152. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833.
153. Id. at 830, 838.
154. Id at 834.
155. Id. at 834, 838.
156. Id at 836.
157. Id. at 835-38 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (Judge Learned Hand's analysis); WILLIAM KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E.
KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 31, at 173 (5th ed. 1984)[hereinafter PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); Hendricks v.
Todora, 722 S.W.2d 458, 461 (rex. Ct. App. 1986) (Texas' own common law precedent)).
158. Eimann, 800 F.2d at 838.
159. Id
160. 938 F.2d 1033. See discussion supra note 20, and accompanying text.
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Cases previously described,161 the Endangering Revelation Cases, where the
newspapers were both speech originators and disseminators when they
revealed the witness/victims' names.
In other Criminal Advertisement Cases, however, where injury or death
resulted from ads in SOF which were less "ambiguous" than was the ad in
Eimann, courts have concluded that the magazine should be subject to negli-
gence judgments. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine16 2 is illustrative.
Bruce Gastwirth hired Richard Savage to murder his business associate,
Richard Braun, through a "gun-for-hire," "all-jobs-considered" ad which
Savage had placed in SOF. Shawn Trevor Doutre, an "employee" of
Savage's, shot Braun to death in his driveway and wounded his sixteen-year
old son, Michael. Michael and an older brother sued SOF and its parent com-
pany, the Omega group, for wrongful death and, in Michael's case, personal
injury.
A federal district court in Alabama denied SOF's motion for summary
judgment. 163 The trial judge ruled that the ad unambiguously offered unlawful
services, perhaps including murder, as well as lawful ones.164 It was therefore
a question for the jury whether or not the criminal activity which ensued was
foreseeable by the magazine and whether the latter had thereby breached a
duty to the plaintiffs by failing to pull the ad. 165 The court found that Savage's
ad, unlike the one in Eimann, could not be classified as "facially innocuous";
that its criminal intent was derived, not merely from the context in which it
was printed, but was obvious from the advertisement itself.166 Applying the
same "risk/benefits" balancing test that the Eimann court had used,167 the
Braun court concluded that:
the likelihood and gravity of the possible harm from an advertise-
ment which, on its face, implies that the advertiser is available to
kill others is so great, and that the social utility of advertising
criminal activity is so small, that imposing a duty on the publisher
not to publish the ad is justified. 68
The district court in Braun also rejected the defendants' First
Amendment defense. Under the rule of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission,169 advertisements for unlawful services are not
protected under the First Amendment. 170 The Braun court cited the Supreme
Court's decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
161. See discussion supra note 131 accompanying text.
162. 749 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
163. Id. at 1088.
164. Id.
165. IM at 1085.
166. Id at 1088 n.l.
167. Id at 1085. The federal court noted that this test was accepted under Georgia law,
citing Ely v. Barbizon Towers, Inc., 115 S.E.2d 616 (Ga. 1960).
168. Braun, 749 F. Supp. at 1085.
169. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
170. Id at 566.
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Rights171 for the proposition that an advertisement which does not contain an
express offer to murder others, "but which contains language easily
interpreted as such an offer," should be similarly unprotected. 72 The Braun
plaintiffs ultimately received a multi-million dollar verdict in their favor, which
the district court reduced but refused to overturn.
173
Similar to Braun is Nonvood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.174
The Norwood plaintiff alleged that he had received personal injuries from sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts on his life which had been engineered through sep-
arate conspiracies formed by means of "gun for hire" ads placed in the
magazine. One of these ads was that of Richard Savage, the same ad that
became the basis of the murder pact in Braun. The second was an almost
identical ad placed by Michael Wayne Jackson. Both ads used the term "gun
for hire," emphasized that "all jobs [would be] considered," and emphasized
that confidentiality would be maintained. 175 Another defendant, Larry Elgin
Gray, was alleged to have entered into separate conspiracies with Savage and
Jackson to have Norwood killed. 76
The feder6l district court in Arkansas denied SOF's motion for summary
judgment.177 As in Braun, the judge ruled that a juror could find that the
advertisements "had a substantial probability of ultimately causing harm to
some individual."178 The court also rejected the magazine's First Amendment
defense, 179 emphasizing the difference between the protection accorded
ideological communication and that accorded commercial advertising.18 0
Summary of Cases
The only cases surveyed in which the causes of action for physical
injury, wrongful death, or emotional distress were permitted to stand were
Exhortation Cases (Weirum disc jockey case, 181 S&W Seafoods "spit at the
restauranteur" case, 8 2 and Vance I, the Judas Priest subliminal message
case 8 3) or Facilitation Cases (Hydel84 and Times Mirror,8 5 the two
171. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). A Pittsburgh municipal ordinance that forbade newspapers
from publishing "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns, except where the
employer can freely make hiring decisions based on sex, did not violate the freedoms of speech
and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
172. Braun, 749 F. Supp. at 1086.
173. 757 F. Supp. 1325, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1991). The jury awarded Michael Braun
$10 million in punitive damages and $375,000 for his personal injury claim, with an additional
$2 million to Michael and his brother on the wrongful death claim. The district court judge
found only the $10 million punitive damage award excessive, and ordered a remittitur to $2
million. SOF has filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, No. 91-7130 (11th Cir. 1991).
174. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
175. Id at 1397-98.
176. Id
177. Id at 1403.
178. Id.
179. Id at 1398-1402.
180. Id at 1399, 1401.
181. Weiruin, 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, discussed supra, note
39 and accompanying text.
182. 390 S.E.2d 228, discussed supra note 46 and accompanying text.
183. Vance I, 16 Media L.Rptr. 2241, discussed supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Endangering Revelation Cases; and Braun'8 6 and Norwood,1 7 two of the three
Criminal Advertisement Cases). In all of these cases, the courts expressly
considered, and rejected, the possibility that the First Amendment might bar
the action.189
The courts viewed the First Amendment as a bar to the actions in most
of the Instruction Cases,18 9 in all of the Inspiration Cases, 90 and in
McCollum,'9 one of the Subliminal Exhortation Cases.92 Only in some of the
Instruction Book Publication Cases193 and Media Advertisement Cases,194 and
also - notably - in Eimann,195 a Criminal Advertisement Case, did courts
avoid the constitutional question altogether and rely exclusively on common
law negligence principles in determining that liability was precluded. Again,
what these cases apparently had in common was that the courts viewed the
media defendants as neutral speech disseminators rather than speech
originators.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEM
In the media physical injury cases surveyed and categorized in Part I,
the courts looked to three different areas or "models" of First Amendment
jurisprudence for guidance:. (A) the clear and present danger test of
Brandenburg v. Ohio,196 (B) the invasion of privacy,197 and (C) the limitations
on the recovery of damages for defamation based upon whether the subject
matter of the speech was or was not "a matter of public concern,"' 9 8 the
184. 637 S.W.2d 251, discussed supra note 131 and accompanying text.
185. 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420., 244 CaL Rptr. 556, discussed supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
186. 749 F. Supp. 1083, discussed supra note 162 and accompanying text.
187. 651 F. Supp. 1397, discussed supra note 174 and accompanying text.
188. Weirum reached this conclusion without applying any specific First Amendment
test. Vance thought that Brandenburg would protect all but the subliminal lyrics, the latter
deemed not to be protected by the First Amendment at all. In the Endangering Revelation cases,
Hyde drew analogies to Gertz, while Times Mirror stressed that public interests were-weightier.
Finally, in the Braun and Nonvood cases, the.ads were deemed unambiguous-in offering illegal
services, and thus Constitutionally-unprotected under the rule of Central Hudson Gas &
Electric.
.189. See discussion, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
190. See discussion, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
191. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, discussed supra, note 57
and accompanying text.
192. The courts in McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187; DeFilippo,
446 A.2d 1036; Olivia N., 126 Cal. App, 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888; Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017;
Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d 1067; and Bill, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, all cited
the First Amendment "clear and present danger" test of Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, as barring
the actions; and the court in Shannon reached the same conclusion using the balancing test of
Schenck, 249 U.S. 47. See discussion supra note 37 and accompanying text.
193. See discussion supra note 14 and accompanying text.
194. See discussion supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
195. Eimann, 880 F.2d 830, discussed supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
196. 395 U.S. 444. See discussion infra notes 200-32 and accompanying text.
197. See discussion, infra notes 233-47 and accompanying text.
198. See discussion, infra notes 248-81 and accompanying text.
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distinction delineated by the Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc..199
Part II examines these three models of First Amendment jurisprudence
and the way that courts have employed them in the media physical injury
cases, and considers whether the analogies drawn in specific cases or cate-
gories were appropriate. Moreover, the section evaluates each model as a
potential basis for a unified First Amendment approach to the media physical
injury cases, considering inter alia, whether the analogy is conceptually appro-
priate, whether the First Amendment values sought to be protected are the
same, and whether, in application, the tests would be over-protective or
under-protective as applied in the media physical injury cases.
A. The Clear and Present Danger Test of Brandenburg v. Ohio
Most courts which have held that the First Amendment barred negli-
gence suits brought against media defendants have applied the rule of
Brandenburg v. Ohio.200 Brandenburg holds that the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press, as embodied in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, "do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent unlawful action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." 201 The Brandenburg test is thus a "bright-line" one, with several
major "hurdles" to be cleared by the government or, in the media physical
injury cases, by tort plaintiffs suing under state negligence law.202 Namely,
they must prove: (1) direct advocacy of unlawful action; (2) the intent to incite
or produce such action; (3) the likelihood that such action would occur; and
(4) that such occurrence might have been imminent. It is a test focusing
specifically on the content of the speech and the circumstances under which it
is conveyed.
The Brandenburg test is so rigorous that if it were read literally and
applied universally in the media physical injury cases, recovery would be
barred in almost all instances. The fact patterns of the media physical injury
cases rarely fit the Brandenburg mold.2 03 The Inspiration and Facilitation
199. 472 U.S. 749 (1985), discussed infra note 255 and accompanying text.
200. 395 U.S. 444. See, e.g., DeFilippo, 446 A.2d 1036; Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d
488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888; Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017; Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d 1067; McCollum,
202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187; Bill, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625;
and Vance 1, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241 (the last, as to the non-subliminal lyrics only).
Notably, the court in Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, discussed supra note 31 and
accompanying text, in ruling that the First Amendment barred the action, did not employ
Brandenburg, but rather, the original formulation of the clear and present danger test posited by
Justice Holmes in Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), discussed infra note 37 and accompanying
text.
201. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, 447.
202. It is assumed in these cases that the state's provision of a private remedy for
tortious injury or wrongful death by way of a civil damage suit is sufficient to create "state
action" as required for the applicability of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, by analogy to
the milestone defamation ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964).
203. For an example of one that might, see S&W Seafoods, 390 S.E.2d 228, discussed
infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Cases would fail the test for lack of "advocacy," and a characterization of
most of the Instruction Cases as involving "advocacy" would be very tenuous.
Only Exhortation cases, like the Weirum disc jockey case204 or the S& W
Seafoods "spit-on-the-restauranteur" case,20 5 are likely to meet the
Brandenburg "advocacy" requirement.
Indeed, if Brandenburg requires that the action "advocated" be an
"unlawful" one, even Weirum might not meet this requirement, depending
upon how its facts are interpreted. 206 Among the Exhortation and Instruction
Cases, the actions allegedly urged or invited are rarely "unlawful" in the
technical sense, but perhaps "dangerous" to the speech recipient or others, as
in both Weirum and Shannon,20 7 or "self-destructive," such as the suicides
allegedly exhorted in McCollum and Vance. 208
If the Brandenburg test could not by its terms permit recovery in an
Instruction Case like Shannon, or perhaps not even in an Exhortation Case
like Weirum, then it is arguably an overly protective "safe harbor" as applied
to many of the media physical injury cases. Moreover, from a conceptual as
well as a practical standpoint, there are a number of reasons why
Brandenburg's application to these cases might be inappropriate.
First, the ultra-protective language of Brandenburg may reflect both the
specific facts of that case and the history of the Court's clear and present
danger jurisprudence, neither of which are likely to have many analogues
among the media physical injury cases. Although the clear and present dan-
ger test is considered to be a constitutional limitation on the ability of govern-
ment to punish the advocacy of a wide range of criminal activities,209 almost all
of the cases in which the Supreme Court has confronted this issue, since
Justice Holmes's original formulation of the test in 1919,210 have involved the
204. See discussion supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
205. See discussion supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
206. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 39-42 & 52-55.
207. Because the Shannon court found that the instructed activity could not be termed
"lawless," it deemed Brandenburg to be inapposite. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582 n.2,
discussed supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
208. See discussions of these cases supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text. With
regards to the applicability of the Brandenburg test to the advocacy or encouragement of suicide,
see discussion infra notes 355-57 and accompanying text.
209. Lower federal and state courts have apparently assumed that the Brandenburg test
is applicable generally to the advocacy of all types of crime and have conformed the relevant
penal statutes accordingly. See, e.g., United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990)(advocating criminal tax fraud); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985)(advocating criminal tax fraud); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1971) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (1956), which prohibits
the use of any communication facility in, inter alia, committing Narcotics Control Act offenses);
Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 42-45 (D. R.I. 1990)
(Brandenburg followed in overturning ban on performance by the rap group, "2 Live Crue");
People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989) (personal
harassment); People v. Mighty, 535 N.Y.S.2d 944, 42 Misc. 2d 37 (N.Y. City Ct. 1988)(incitement to riot); Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886 (Del. 1987) (solicitation to commit arson
and assault); State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374 (La. 1987) (solicitation of prostitution); State v.
Davis, 272 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. 1980) (solicitation of sale of marijuana).
210. Schenck, 249 U.S. 47,52. "The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
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prosecution and conviction of individuals who had allegedly advocated crimes
while voicing highly unpopular political views 1
While some justices expressed concern that the defendants' political
views or affiliations might have adversely affected the outcome of their
cases, 212 the Court's earlier decisions had provided these "political" defen-
dants little relief. The clear and present danger test was for decades virtually
ignored in deference to legislative judgment respecting the gravity of danger
posed by the crimes advocated 2 13 Later, in Dennis v. United States,214 the
test was resurrected in the form of a balancing test wherein the improbability
of a criminal action occurring might be outweighed by the danger potentially
posed if the criminal action ultimately occurred. 215 Consequently, prior to
Brandenburg, the Court rarely used the clear and present danger theory to
overturn the convictions of those who had advocated violent overthrow of the
government or other unlawful activity216 Brandenburg's ultra-protective re-
formulation of the test may not only reflect the liberal Warren Court's sense of
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id.
Schenck had been convicted of encouraging insubordination in the military and of obstructing
the World War I draft, having mailed letters to draftees urging them to assert their rights in terms
which the jury interpreted as violative of the statute. kd
211. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (worker-member of
Communist Party); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (state chairman of Communist
Party); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (second-level leadership of Communist
Party; advocacy of violent overthrow of government); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (organization and leadership of the Communist Party of the United States, and advocacy
of violent overthrow of the federal government); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(membership in a state communist labor party which advocated criminal syndicalism); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).(advocacy of mass political strikes for the destruction of the
parliamentary state); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (advocating a general strike
to frustrate U.S. military intervention against the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, thereby
impeding the war effort against Germany); Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 (advocating insubordination in
the military and resistance to the World War I draft).
212. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250 U.S.
at 629-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
213. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. 375; Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652.
214. 341 U.S. 494.
215. See id. at 510. Dennis was a post-World War II federal prosecution of high-
ranking leaders of the American Communist Party under the Smith Act of 1940. The latter was
in effect a federal version of the state criminal syndicalism statutes upheld in Gitlow and
Whitney. In affirming the convictions, the Court expressly adopted the reformulation of the
"clear and present danger" test devised by Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in Dennis: "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." See Dennis v. United
States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
Query whether Judge Hand's Dennis test was, properly speaking, a "clear and present
danger" test at all. Nothing'in his formulation referred to the imminence of the danger, and as
for its likelihood, that was to be discounted by its gravity. As in the case of Communist-
advocated revolution, the low probability of the danger could be discounted in view of the
terrible consequences should it come to fruition.
216. The exceptions were cases in which the Court found the defendants had been
convicted for affiliation with a party advocating the violent overthrow of the government, but
that the defendants had at most advocated or subscribed to abstract doctrine. See, e.g., Yates,
354 U.S. 298 (reversing the conviction of second-string Communist party officials, finding in
the record no adequate evidence of the advocacy of unlawful action, as opposed to abstract
doctrine); Note, 367 U.S. 290 (reversing conviction of Communist party worker on similar
grounds).
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the "political" nature of the clear and present danger cases, but also, perhaps,
a sense that the Court bad historically failed to provide adequate protection. 21 7
The toughness of the Brandenburg formulation may also reflect the
specific facts of that case. Unlike precedents which had involved the prose-
cution of persons who had subscribed to party manifestos or platforms advo-
cating political change by unlawful force,218 Brandenburg involved the pros-
ecution, under a state criminal syndicalism statute,219 of a Ku Klux Klan leader
who had urged similar actions and voiced racist epithets at a Klan rally;220 a
"live" speaker haranguing an empathetic crowd. The rigorous clear and
present danger test posited by the Court, in unanimously reversing the
conviction,221 may be premised on the assumption that even in this combustible
situation, the speaker may still deserve constitutional protection if "incitement"
to imminent unlawful action is not both the intention and the likelihood. 222
217. The Brandenburg test incorporates all of the protections that Holmes and Brandeis
had been concerned about- intent, likelihood, and imminency - and adds another important
protection as well. Under Brandenburg, abstract teaching cannot be the basis for criminal
sanction; the words themselves must be "directed to" the incitement or production of the
imminent lawless action. Ih at 448-49.
Holmes himself might have disagreed on this point. In his dissent in Gitlow, he wrote:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.
268 U.S. at 673.
However, the distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and direct incitement was
developing contemporaneously to the "clear and present danger" doctrine itself. See, e.g., Judge
Hand's distinction between "keys of persuasion" and "triggers of action" in Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (granting injunction to publisher of anti-war
magazine against New York City postmaster who had denied him access to mails under
Espionage Act of 1917). The Supreme Court had accepted the distinction prior to Brandenburg.
See, e.g., Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98 ("[The mpre abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action or steeling it to such action."); Yates, 354 U.S. 298.
218. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. 357; Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652.
219. These statutes punish the advocacy of political revolution by armed force, violence,
or terror. Between 1917 and 1920, twenty states and two territories had adopted identical or
similar laws (see Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (citing E. DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL
SYNDICALISM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1939)), apparently as part of a
widespread political back-lash to the Communist-led revolutions which had swept central and
eastern Europe in the wake of World War I. Prosecutions under similar laws had been upheld in
Whitney, 274 U.S. 357, and Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652.
220. A Cincinnati television reporter-announcer had been invited to attend and film a
small Ku Klux Klan rally, at which a number of the participants wore firearms, a cross was
burned, and the leader made some disjointed remarks that could have been taken as a threat of
armed violence against the federal government. The KKK leader had said, inter alia: "We're not
a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance
taken." See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446. He then mentioned a march on Congress by 4,000
men on July 4th. Id. In a second film, the leader expressed his personal opinion that races he
considered undesirable should be deported from the country. Id. at 447. Portions of the first
film were later broadcast on a local station and on a national network.
221. Id. at 449.
222. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). A Vietnam War demonstrator,
part of a crowd cleared off of a college campus street and onto the sidewalks by the local police,
was arrested for disorderly conduct when he said to the crowd, "We'll take the fucking street
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Aside from the fact that very few of the media physical injury cases are
likely to have the political dimension that arguably "put the teeth" into the
Brandenburg test, there is another important conceptual difference between
the two lines of jurisprudence. The Brandenburg test is, again, a limitation on
the power of governments to impose prior restraints or subsequent punishment
upon those who advocate unlawful actions. It is irrelevant whether the listen-
ers responded and whether the unlawful actions, or any injuries or damages
consequential thereto, actually occurred.223 In the media physical injury cases,
by comparison, the speech recipient or a third-party victim has already
sustained injuries alleged to be the proximate result of the speech, and seeks
compensation by way of damages under state tort law.224 This conceptual
difference might explain in part why the Brandenburg test is as speech-pro-
tective as it is, and why it is arguably too speech-protective to be applied to
the media physical injury cases.
If one were to put aside the conceptual problems with the clear and
present danger analogy, and look only to outcome-oriented practicalities, one
possible solution might be to construe the Brandenburg language as broadly as
possible, so that the test would be less speech-protective as applied in the
media physical injury cases. There is some precedent and authority to sup-
port this strategy.
For example, it has been argued that the Brandenburg test was always
designed to reach the advocacy of actions that were "dangerous" even if not
technically "unlawful," as long as it was within the legislative power to crimi-
nalize the action.2 25 Certainly this would make for fairer results in actions for
negligent physical injury than the narrow, literal Brandenburg language.226
Indeed, in most of the media physical injury cases, the difference between the
"dangerous" and the "dangerous and unlawful" is arguably only the difference
between legislative oversight and hindsight. For purposes of civil liability,
Weirum should be decided in. the plaintiffs favor whether or not the radio
later," or, by other accounts, "We'll take the fucking street again." Id. at 107. The Supreme
Court, employing the Brandenburg test, reversed his conviction noting that "[a]t best ... the
statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time." Id at 108.
223. Indeed, in most of the advocacy of unlawful action cases in which the Court has
ruled, it was clear that the criminal action advocated had not occurred. See, e.g., Abrams, 250
U.S. 616; Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652; Whitney, 274 U.S. 357; Dennis, 341 U.S. 494;
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Hess, 414 U.S. 105. In other cases, such as Schenck, 249 U.S.
47, it would have been difficult to know whether or not the criminal action had occurred; but
again, proof thereof is not required for conviction under the federal statute in that case or similar
statutes, nor would Brandenburg require such proof.
224. In this respect, the media physical injury cases are more analogous to actions for
the recovery of damages for defamation. See discussion, infra notes 248-78 and accompanying
text.
225. See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 698-
99; Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of
Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1179 n.91 (1982). Notably, Justice
Holmes, in his original formulation of the test in Schench, referred to the words of the speaker
creating "a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
226. Many dangerous, violent or self-injurious actions might, however, be technically
characterized as unlawful "breaches of the peace" in order to fit the Brandenburg terminology.
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announcer specifically "intended" that his listeners commit moving vehicle
violations, even if such intent might be required for purposes of criminal
liability.
Similarly, if intentional subliminal exhortation to commit suicide had been
found in McCollum or Vance, the outcome on the question of civil liability
should not have turned upon whether it was technically "unlawful" within the
jurisdiction to commit or to attempt to commit suicide. 227
Another way to make the Brandenburg test less over-protective in the
media physical injury cases would be to loosely interpret the "imminency;'
requirement. State and lower federal courts have done this in prosecutions for
the solicition of criminal action at a future date, suggesting that where the
crime is grave enough, it would be deemed "imminent" notwithstanding the
time lapse from the solicitation. 228 Notably, the practical effect of this broad
construction of the imminency requirement is to bring Brandenburg closer to
its "predecessor" clear and present danger test, that of Dennis v. United
States, where the gravity of the danger could be discounted by its improbabil-
ity, and imminency did not seem to be a requirement at all.
Even if Brandenburg's constitutionally unprotected zone were
"broadened" by substituting a "dangerous" requirement for the "unlawful"
requirement, even if "imminency" and "intent" were loosely interpreted as
well, an approach predicated on "advocacy" or "incitement" would still
arguably be overly-protective as applied in the media physical injury cases.
For example, this "modified Brandenburg" test would apparently offer a "safe
harbor" protection in Dangerous Instruction Cases. 229 Should invitation by
way of instruction to an activity whose danger is not obvious to the speech
227. The court in McCollum apparently assumed that the advocating of suicide could
satisfy the Brandenburg test. 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193. The Herceg
court expressly avoided this same question. 814 F.2d at 1022. Notably, while no state still
criminalizes by statute the act of committing suicide or attempting to commit suicide, many states
do criminalize by statute the encouragement or solicitation of another to commit suicide. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988 & 1992 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645
(1987 & 1990 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105
(1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:11-6 (West 1982); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505(b) (1983 & 1991
Supp.); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1989 & 1992 Supp.). Suicide was a felony
and attempted suicide was a misdemeanor at common law. See 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *189. Some older common law decisions, deeming suicide to be
"unlawful," albeit rulings of questionable status, might still survive. See, e.g., Wallace v. State,
116 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1953); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877). See generally
Thomas J. Marzen, Mary K. O'Dowd, Daniel Crone, and Thomas J. Balch, Suicide: A
Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1 app. (1985) (including a state-by-state survey of
American suicide laws).
228. See, e.g., People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 978, 158 Cal.Rptr. 488, 492-93
(1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980) (an offer of $500 to anyone "who kills, maims, or
seriously injures a member of the American Nazi Party," made at a press conference in
connection with a protest of a Nazi march planned for five weeks hence, could constitute
solicitation to murder and was not protected by the First Amendment; "imminent' under
Brandenburg even if not intended to take place until five weeks bad passed). Cf United States
v. Compton, 428 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1971) (threat to
assassinate the president two weeks later). See also United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020,
1029 (2d Cir.1976) (Mulligan, J., concurring).
229. See discussion supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text.
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recipient, as in Shannon, be constitutionally-protected from civil liability, while
exhortation to an activity with a danger obvious to all be unprotected?
Brandenburg's protection would still automatically be extended to Hustler in
Herceg, which, again, is also arguably viewed as a Dangerous Instruction
Case.230 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, if Brandenburg had been the
chosen First Amendment model in Hyde and in Times Mirror, the
Endangering Revelation Cases, it would have barred the actions. The news-
papers arguably aided criminal action when they printed the names of the
crime victim and witness, but they certainly did not advocate or incite criminal
action.
The Brandenburg test is thus overly-protective as applied to some, and
conceptually inappropriate as applied to the majority, of the media physical
injury cases. The practical problems of over-protection are alleviated, but not
fully eliminated, by current theories for broadening the construction of its
terms. The remaining practical problems could be eliminated by further
"stretching" the Brandenburg language, so that words like "advocacy" and
"incitement" no longer have their common meanings. The ultimate question
would be how much elasticity could be injected into Brandenburg's language
before it would no longer be the Brandenburg test, having metamorphosed into
something entirely different.
Not all of the courts or judges reviewing negligent media injury cases
have, however, assumed that the proper constitutional focus was on the
Brandenburg clear and present danger test. Analogies have also been made
to First Amendment jurisprudence relating to the torts of privacy invasion231
and defamation.
B. Analogy to Privacy Invasion
In Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court,233 the Endangering Revelation
case, the court focused on First Amendment jurisprudence respecting the
right to privacy.234 The plaintiff apparently made the invasion of privacy her
primary claim. In its defense, the Times Mirror raised an entire line of cases
establishing the press' right to print "lawfully-obtained, truthful information" in
the face of civil privacy invasion claims or state enforcement of statutes
designed to protect privacy. 235 While leaving open the question of whether
future fact-findings at trial might bring this case in line with these precedents,
the appellate court concluded that the state's interest in protecting crime wit-
nesses and conducting criminal investigations would be sufficient to overcome
230. See discussion supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
231. See discussion infra notes 233-47 and accompanying text.
232. See discussion infira notes 248-78 and accompanying text.
233. 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S.
1094 (1989), discussed supra, notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
234. Id at 1425-26, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60.
235. Id. at 1431-32, 244 Cal. Rptr. 563-64 (citing, inter alia, Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308(1977)). The most recent important decision in this line of jurisprudence is The Florida Star,
491 U.S. 524.
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defendant's First Amendment rights, and precluded summary judgment for the
media defendant.236
Times Mirror is not, however, a true privacy invasion case, and the
court's focus on this claim is misleading. The tort of "privacy invasion" is
about the public revelation of truthful facts that are humiliating and embarrass-
ing.237 There was nothing inherently embarrassing about this plaintiff's status
as a crime witness,23  and that "status" would not have remained "private" if
the suspect had been apprehended later and brought to trial. When the press
reveals the name and whereabouts of a crime victim and/or witness when the
suspect is still at-large, the primary tort at issue is the negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and perhaps injury or death as well. As in the Hyde
case, 239 the true issue in Times Mirror was negligent endangerment, which in
both cases caused emotional distress even though the plaintiffs were spared
worse consequences.U0
In the Endangering Revelation cases, companion causes of action for
privacy invasion might be well-pleaded where there is something arguably
embarrassing about the endangered witness' status as a victim of rape,
sodomy, incest, child molestation or similar crimes 41 Although neither Times
Mirror nor Hyde fits this description, there might be, in some Endangering
236. Tunes Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 564, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 1432.
237. The cause of action for invasion of privacy requires the publication concerning theprivate life of another "if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652(D) (1977). See, e.g. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977). For examples of privacy invasion actions
brought under state common law or statute for the revelation of the names of rape victims, see,
e.g., The Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
See also Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 493
U.S. 935 (1989).
238. Justice Butler, dissenting in Times Mirror, argued that the defendants'
identification of the plaintiff as the discoverer of the murder would not be a revelation of private
matters so offensive and embarrassing as to form the basis of a privacy action. 198 Cal. App.
3d at 1436, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (Butler, J., dissenting).
239. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1226 (1983), discussed supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
240. See Times Mirror, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 1426, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (comparing
the case to Hyde). However, the court in Times Mirror specifically avoided the question
whether the plaintiff could maintain independant causes of action for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress if summary judgment had been granted on the invasion of privacy
cause of action. Id. at 1433 n.5, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 565 n.5.
Justice Butler, dissenting in Times Mirror, believed that all of the plaintiff's causes of
action must fail. Id. at 1436-37, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (Butler, J., dissenting). Because he
believed the revelation of the victim's name to be "newsworthy", Justice Butler concluded that
the defendants enjoyed an absolute First Amendment immunity in publishing the name. Id, at1433-37, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 565-67 (Butler, J., dissenting).
The year after the Times Mirror decision, the Supreme Court in Florida Star, 491 U.S.524, made its most recent ruling to date on the First Amendment's impact on state privacy
invasion statutes and actions, in a case where privacy invasion and negligent endangerment
theories did converge. For an explanation why the Florida Star ruling would not necessarily
preclude state-enforced recovery for intentional and negligent infliction of mental distress or
physical injury or wrongful death on a theory of endangerment of crime witnesses, including
victims, by the publication of their names, see discussion infra note 242.
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Revelation Cases, a convergence of a privacy invasion cause of action with
one predicated on a theory of negligent endangerment. There is, however, no
particular reason to analogize one line of jurisprudence to the other, even in
the category-specific situation where this convergence might occur.242
A very different type of analogy to the privacy invasion jurisprudence is
found in the trial court's initial ruling in Vance 1.243 Again, the court ruled that
subliminal exhortations to suicide might be the basis for a cause of action
predicated on the intentional invasion of the privacy of one's thoughts. 244
While this novel and interesting approach might have some intrinsic merit, it is
much too category-specific to be of any use in devising a general approach to
the media physical injury cases. Indeed, the "subliminal exhortation to sui-
cide" cases like Vance and McColIum 245 are different than all of the other
cases under discussion, except S&W Seafoods,246 the "spit on the restau-
ranteur" case. In each of these three cases, the plaintiff's theory was that
defendant intended that harm to someone should occur,247 rather than that
such harm was the consequence of the defendant's negligence.
241. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, discussed infra note 242 and
accompanying text.
242. In Florida Star, the Supreme Court ruled that "where a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at
all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order," in holding that a Florida
statute could not impose civil damage liability on a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape
victim obtained from a police report to which the press was given access. l at 541
The physical protection of witnesses was argued to be one of the interests vindicated by
the Florida statute, along with the protection of the privacy of victims of sexual offenses and the
state policy of encouraging rape victims to report the crimes without fear of exposure Id. at 537.
Notably, the Court never suggested that these asserted state interests would not be "of the
highest order"; indeed, the Court described these three interests as being "highly significant."
Id
Rather, the Florida statute failed for not being narrowly tailored enough on its face and as
applied in the case at hand: the press had gotten the information from a government press release
because the sheriff's office had failed to abide by the statutory policy; the use of a negligence per
se standard by the courts below was deemed inappropriate; and the statute's facial
underinclusiveness in only reaching the mass media undercut the state's asserted interest in
protecting privacy. Id at 537-41.
Florida Star would not, therefore, preclude the possibility of state imposition of civil
liability for physical injury, wrongful death, or related emotional distress resulting from media
dissemination of truthful, lawfully-obtained information respecting the identity or location of
crime witnesses (including crime victims), as in Hyde, 637 S.W.2d 251, and Times Mirror,
198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556.
243. Vance 1, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241. See discussion supra at notes 64-77 and
accompanying text.
244. 16 Media L. Rep.(BNA) at 2251-54.
245. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, discussed supra note 56-
63 and accompanying text.
246. 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), discussed supra note 46-51 and
accompanying text.
247. Again, the failure of the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants had intentionally
inserted the subliminal exhortation was the grounds for the Vance court's grant of judgment to
the defendants. See Vance 11, 1990 WL 130920, at 18-19, discussed supra notes 64-77 and
accompanying text.
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C. Analogy to Defmnation
Constitutional standards for the recovery of damages in defamation
actions have also been used for purposes of analogy in the search for First
Amendment standards in the negligent media injury cases. The analysis
varies according to whether the speech alleged to have caused the injury is or
is not deemed a matter "of public concern."
In her concurrence/dissent in the Herceg autoerotic asphyxiation case,
Judge Edith H. Jones emphasized that the Supreme Court had recognized a
"hierarchy" of First Amendment values in its First Amendment jurispru-
dence.248 That hierarchy is exemplified by stronger protection for the media
where the subject of a defamation action is a matter "of public concern" as
opposed to a matter "of private concern." 249 For Judge Jones, it was irrele-
vant that Hustler's pornographic article on autoerotic asphyxiation did not fit
into historical categories of unprotected speech;250 irrelevant that it might not
be technically "obscene" under the Court's jurisprudence, but might only
border upon that category; 251 and irrelevant that it could not pass the
Brandenburg test for unprotected advocacy of unlawful action. 252 Indeed,
Judge Jones considered the majority's analogy to Brandenburg to be
"inappropriate," 253 in part because the latter "addressed prior restraints on
public advocacy of controversial political ideas," and its holding therefore
rested "in the core values protected by the first amendment." 254
Rather, Judge Jones felt that the better analogy for Herceg was Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,2 55 wherein the Supreme Court
had held that the subject of the defamation action, a negligently erroneous
credit report, was not a matter "of public concern," having been prepared only
for the individual interest of the speaker and a specific business, and, like
advertising, representing a form of speech unlikely to be deterred by incidental
state regulation. 256 The Court had concluded that the First Amendment
interest at stake in Greenmoss was less important than if it had been a matter
"of public concern," and consequently the recovery of presumed and punitive
248. Herceg v. Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017, 1027 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
959 (1988).
249. Id. at 1028-29 (comparing Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, discussed infra note 253, with
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)).
In Greenmoss, the Court held that the victim of a negligently erroneous credit report
might recover presumed and punitive damages without proving "malice," because, unlike Gertz,
the matter was one "of private concern." 472 U.S. at 763. See Cynthia Estlund, Speech on
Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
250. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1026 (citing child pornography, fighting words, incitement to
lawless conduct, libel, defamation or fraud, and obscenity).
251. lit at 1026-27.
252. Id at 1029.
253. Id at 1029-30.
254. Id at 1029.
255. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
256. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028-29.
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damages would not require proof of malice as it would in the latter case, under
the Court's prior ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.257
By analogy to Greenmoss, Judge Jones believed that Hustler magazine
in general, and its 'Orgasm of Death" article in particular, deserved only lim-
ited First Amendment protection. 25' She viewed Hustler as a "profitable
commercial enterprise," "pandering" to a small portion of the population with
a prurient, borderline obscenity appeal that "is not based on cognitive or intel-
lectual appreciation."2 59 For her, it was easy to reach the same conclusion as
the Supreme Court had in Greenmoss; that is, that the speech at issue was
not that which "requires special protection to insure that 'debate on public
issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide.open."' 2 6  Such pornography,
whether or not found to be technically obscene under the current First
Amendment jurisprudence, 261 should, in Judge Jones' opinion, be accorded "a
lower value on the scale of constitutional protection," 262 and the state should
be permitted to regulate it by means of tort recovery for injury directly caused
thereby, so long as such recovery is "tailored to specific harm and not broader
than necessary to accomplish its purpose." 263
The full implications of Judge Jones' analysis are unclear. Her observa-
tions may, on the one hand, be viewed as category-specific and of limited
application: Herceg is unusual among the cases surveyed both in that
"Orgasm of Death" was at best pornography bordering on unprotected
obscenity,2 64 and in that, as a case ostensibly about "imitation" in the face of
express warnings against such, it still tread perilously close to being one in
257. 418 U.S. 323. In Gertz, an attorney representing the family of a youth, slain by a
policeman, in a wrongful death action, was defamed in an article in a right-wing newspaper.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Gertz was not a "public figure" and therefor not subject
to the so-called "malice" requirement (that the defamatory statement was made with knowledge
of the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth) of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). Nevertheless, because the matter in which the defamation arose was one "of public
concern," the Court ruled that "malice" had to be shown for Gertz to recover for any damages
beyond those attributable to "actual injury," such as presumed or punitive damages. 418 U.S. at
349.
258. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028.
259. Id at 1028.
260. Id at 1028 (quoting Greennoss, 472 U.S. at 762, which, in turn, quoted Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 270).
261. Under the current standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), "obscenity" such as may be regulated by the states by means, inter
alia, of prior restraints, is to be determined by the fact-finder by consideration of these "basic
guidelines":
[(a)] whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; [(b)]
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id at 24 (quoting Kois v. WIsconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
262. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1029.
263. Id
264. Judge Jones noted that at trial, "Orgasm of Death" might be found to be "obscene"
under the Miller test, and therefore unprotected altogether. Verceg, 814 F.2d at 1029.
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which there was straightforward "invitation by instruction" to engage in an
ultra-dangerous activity.265
On the other hand, Judge Jones' emphasis on a "hierarchy" of protec-
tion levels among different types of First Amendment-protected speech, and
her suggestion that one way of defining that hierarchy should be the
dichotomy between speech on matters "of public concern" and speech on
matters "of private concern" as developed in the First Amendment defama-
tion cases, might have much broader implications for the present discussion.
If speech on matters "of public concern" were narrowly defined as that which
is necessary to "debate on public issues," 266 it is doubtful that the speech at
issue in most of the media physical injury cases under discussion, or in many
that would arise in the future, could be characterized as fitting that definition.
If Greenmoss were deemed to be the proper analogy to these cases, on the
theory that the speech involved was merely "of private concern," a possible
implication is that the First Amendment would not, in most cases, act as a bar
to or other limitation upon a negligence claim against the media for physical
injury or wrongful death.
Indeed, the analogy to the First Amendment defamation jurisprudence
might afford little constitutional protection even in the media physical injury
cases where the subject speech was about a matter "of public concern." In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 6 7 the case distinguished from Greenmoss
because the defamation was held to concern a "private person" but related to
a matter "of public concern," 268 the Supreme Court had held that "so long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." 269 Correspondingly, the
court in Hyde,270 the Endangering Revelation case, looked to Gertz by analogy
to conclude that, even if the crime victim's name was a matter "of public
concern," as the defendant newspapers had asserted, the plaintiff would still
be in compliance with the First Amendment because she had pleaded a cause
of action in negligence, and had not merely alleged strict liability.27 '
Worse, if the speech in a media physical injury case were about a mat-
ter "of private concern," and the analogy were to Greenmoss, it is also
arguable that, from the standpoint of the First Amendment, strict liability would
suffice. In Greenmoss, the Court did not take the opportunity to restate what
it had said a decade earlier in Gertz about "no strict liability." Although this
omission in Greenmoss might be explained in that the Vermont courts had
265. Judge Jones noted that Hustler knew that "the article is dangerously explicit, lethal,
and likely to be distributed to those members of society who are most vulnerable to its message."
Id. at 1027 (Jones, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
266. Id. at 1028-29 (Jones, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citing Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 270).
267. 418 U.S. 323, discussed supra note 257.
268. Id. at 347.
269. Id
270. 637 S.W.2d 251, discussed supra note 138 and accompanying text.
271. See id.
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already conformed the state's defamation law to Gerz,272 and negligence had
been both pleaded and found by the jury,2 7 3 some commentators have
interpreted the omission as a signal that states can revert to strict liability for
defamation in the "private person/private concern," Greenmoss-type case.2 74
The Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to clarify the matter.
Therefore, if the media physical injury cases were "constitutionalized"
along the First Amendment defamation law model, with specific analogy to
Greenmoss, it is uncertain whether even negligence would be required; strict
liability might sufficeP5
Granted, this is a "worst-case scenario." The Court has not specifically
ruled that strict liability would suffice in Greenmoss-type cases. Moreover,
arguably the Hyde court read the analogy to defamation law too literally when
it concluded that, by analogy to Gertz, proof of mere negligence would have
sufficed if the crime victim's name were assumed to be a matter "of public
concern." 276 After all, the Supreme Court had intended that some very
significant differences, as to damage recovery, and perhaps as to the elements
of the cause of action as well, should turn on the Gertz/Greenmoss "of pub-
lic/private concern" distinction. Perhaps the proper conclusion to be drawn
from the analogy to defamation is that when the speech in the media physical
injury cases regards a matter "of public concern," something more than negli-
gence should be constitutionally required; and that when the speech regards a
272. See Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162, 1168 n.1 (Vt. 1983) (reading Gertz as
stating a general rule of "no strict liability" in defamation, at least not for media defandants).
Most of the states had subsequently conformed their statutory or decisional defamation law by
eliminating strict liability and substituting some requirement of fault, usually equated with
"negligence" or something more. See, e.g., Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711,
771 P.2d 406, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1989); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38
N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 1 Media L.Rep.(BNA) 1693 (1975).
273. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 752-55.
274. See, e.g., Rodney Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New
Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1545-48 (1987)
(hereinafter Smolla); Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New
Directions in First Amendment Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REV. 767,774-75 (1987).
275. Notably, Judge Jones in her Herceg concurrence/dissent thought it inappropriate to
speculate on what theory of liability the Texas courts might accept in that case, although she did
mention negligence and attractive nuisance as seeming "theoretically appropriate." Herceg, 814
F.2d at 1030 (Jones, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). And attractive nuisance is,
today, also understood in "negligence" terms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 339
(1977); PROSSER, supra note 157 § 59, at 402.
276. Actually, the Hyde court's use of a negligence standard, by accepting for the sake
of argument the newspaper defendants' claim that the victim/witness' name was "of public
concern" and therefore analogous to Gertz, arguably produced the correct result in this case, if
perhaps for the wrong reason. If the victim/witness' name was not a matter "of public concern"
given the risk to her while her assailant was still at-large, then either the "malice" standard of
Sullivan, or the clear and present danger test of Brandenburg, would have been over-protective
of the press. For an explanation of why the defamation analogy is more appropriate in the
Endangering Revelation cases than in any other of the media physical injury cases, see
discussion infra Section IV(b)(2).
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matter "of private concern," then negligence, but not strict liability, would
constitutionally suffice?2n
Still, the defamation analogy remains problematical in requiring difficult
and. highly subjective judgments as to what is or is not "of public concern." If
that definition were as limited as Judge Jones suggested in Herceg, few of the
negligent media physical injury cases would merit constitutional protection.
On the other hand, from a conceptual standpoint, the defamation analogy
would have an advantage over the Brandenburg clear and present danger
analogy in that, like the media physical injury cases, the defamation cases are
about the compensation for injuries after they have occurred.2 78
To summarize, all three of the First Amendment "models" being cur-
rently used in the media physical injury cases are in one way or another
problematic. The analogy to privacy invasion, used in Times Mirror, the
Endangering Revelation Case, is incorrect and misleading. The two favored,
potentially conflicting,279 models for purposes of analogy to the media physical
injury cases - the Brandenburg clear and present danger test and the
Gertz/Greenmoss defamation jurisprudence - offer alternatives that are
almost bipolar and neither satisfactory. Brandenburg, used to offer a "safe
harbor" with a narrow range of protection denial, is over-protective. The
Greenmoss "of public concern" test, drawn from the defamation cases as a
de minimis requirement for protection, would be highly under-protective. As
suggested,28 0 there may be ways to broadly interpret each of these tests so as
to try to mitigate these consequences when applied to the media physical
injury cases.
Nevertheless, broad construction will not totally solve all of the practical
problems presented by these two models, and will not address the conceptual
ones. The problem may lie not merely with the analogies that courts are
presently using in the media physical injury cases, but perhaps in any
approach to the problem focused exclusively on the content of the speech and
its categorization. 281
Emphatically, if the only practical choice were between an over-protec-
tive, content-categorizing test such as Brandenburg's, and an under-protective,
content-ranking test such as Greenmoss', the First Amendment should require
that the former be chosen. Courts could continue to use a loosely-construed
277. Judge Jones, in her Herceg dissent, did not go so far as to suggest that strict
liability would suffice in that case. Rather, her opinion allowed that, given the analogy to
defamation, an article "not of public concern" like "Orgasm of Death" deserved "limited ... first
amendment protection." 814 F.2d at 1028 (Jones, J., dissenting). Elsewhere, she suggested
that were the Texas courts permitted to fashion a theory of liability in Herceg, "negligence and
attractive nuisance [would be] theoretically appropriate." Id. at 1030 (Jones, J., dissenting).
278. See discussion supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
279. See Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017, discussed supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
280. See discussions supra notes 224-32 & 275-77 and accompanying text.
281. In this regard, Brandenburg has multiple deficiencies, having been designed to
protect controversial political speech in the context of incitement. The analogy to the
GertzlGreenmoss "of public concern" distinction, on the other hand, looks only to the "social
utility" of the speech in terms of the "political theory" of the First Amendment or, at best, the
broader search for "truth" in the "marketplace of ideas" which permits judges to make highly
subjective judgments about what speech is valuable in our society.
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version of the Brandenburg test to provide a relatively wide "safe harbor" in
the media physical injury cases, and if the Endangering Revelation Cases can-
not be conceptually reconciled, or if occasionally an unjust result occurs, as
many might think the case in Shannon, arguably these would be small prices
to pay for the broad protection of free speech.
The question remains, however, whether these two models do in fact
represent the only practical approaches to the media physical injury cases, or
the most conceptually accurate ones.
Part III, which follows, suggests a different First Amendment approach
to the media physical injury cases. It focuses on the media's role in the dis-
semination of speech, and the relationship between the dissemination of
speech and common law negligence principles.
III. TOWARDS A NEW, UNIFIED FIRST AMENDMENT
APPROACH
A. Identifying the First Amendment Yalues at Stake in the Media Physical
Injury Cases
The Supreme Court has yet to establish or recognize a single, compre-
hensive theory of the First Amendment.28 2 Rather, the Court has addressed
First Amendment problems on a case-by case basis in diverse and often unre-
lated areas of concern - criminal incitement,283 fighting words, 28 4 hostile
audiences, 285 disclosures of information affecting national security, 286
defamation, 28 7 privacy invasion,288 commercial speech,289 obscenity290 -
282. The three major theories in support of the First Amendment are: (i) that free speech
is necessary for the preservation of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in the pursuit of "truth"
(the "marketplace of ideas theory") (see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); (ii) that free speech is essential
to intelligent self-govenment in a democratic system (the "political theory") (see Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-271 ("debate on
public issues"); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
EV. 245; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); ALEXANDER
ME OIOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)); and (iii) that
free speech promotes individual self-fulfillment and self-realization (see Red Lion Broadcasting
Co., 395 U.S. at 390; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982)). See generally GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998-1001 (12th ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 786-89 (2d ed. 1988); JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6, at 835-37 (3d ed. 1986).
283. See, e.g., Hess, 414 U.S. 105; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Schenck, 249 U.S.
47. See generally discussion supra notes 200-32 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
285. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
286. See, e.g., New York Tunes Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case),
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
287. See, e.g., Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749; Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254. See generally discussion supra notes 248-47 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., The Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, discussed supra note 242.
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thereby creating a jurisprudence of divergent strands. It is nevertheless
notable that the Court developed each strand of that jurisprudence in response
to government-imposed penalties and regulations which the Court viewed as
inimical to identifiable First Amendment values in a particular area of concern.
The problem is to identify the First Amendment values that would justify
placing constitutional limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to recover damages
for physical harm resulting from allegedly negligent media speech. To date,
the constitutional debate has focused primarily on the content of the subject
speech. In the Inspiration Cases, for example, most of the judges were willing
to rely on Brandenburg's bright-line, safe-harbor test: if the speech was not
criminal advocacy, it did not really matter very much what it was; the First
Amendment should protect it from negligence suits for physical injury as it
would against prior restraints or government sanctions. 291 The notable
exception here was, of course, Judge Jones, who in Herceg emphasized the
low social value of pornography and the de minimis constitutional protection it
deserved. 292 To her mind, non-obscene pornography might not be subject to
prior restraints, but it should be subject to civil negligence actions for physical
harm. Using the GertzlGreenmoss analogy, she might well say the same for
all speech not "of public concern."
Notably, though, both sides of this debate are focusing on questions
about the general classification or specific content of the speech. Without
suggesting that these are irrelevant to the present inquiry, it is submitted that
the exclusive focus thereon may obscure the important First Amendment
value which is served by bringing the amendment into play in speech-related
media physical injury cases.
The public has a very strong interest in receiving speech encompassing
a broad panoply of ideas and information. The Supreme Court has spoken of
the First Amendment right of the media audience to have access to "social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences. 293 Over the years,
289. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
290. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
291. Indeed, the judges' near-unanimous reluctance to evaluate the content or social
value of the subject speech is entirely understandable given both the Supreme Court's historical
reluctance to formally adopt any single theory for the First Amendment. See discussion supra
notes 282-90 and accompanying text.
292. 814 F.2d at 1028 (Jones, J., dissenting). See discussion supra notes 248-66 and
accompanying text. Recent Supreme Court decisions arguably support her view in this regard.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991). See discussion infra notes
375-77 and accompanying text.
293. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. This decision upheld the FCC's fairness doctrine,
which required broadcast licensees to give air-time to persons attacked on their program and to
proponents of opposing views on topics on which they had editorialized. In Red Lion and
subsequent cases, this "right to receive information" has been viewed as derivative of the two
leading theories of the First Amendment, the "political theory " and the "marketplace of ideas,"
focusing respectively on the right to receive information of political value and information useful
in the pursuit of "truth." See id at 390. See also First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765(1978) (public's right to hear corporate speech on public issues); Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (consumers' right
to prescription drug pricing. information); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)
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the Court has vindicated that societal interest by a gradual expansion of the
types of speech deemed to be protected by the First Amendment; eroding
those categories of speech historically assumed to be beyond its ambit.2 94 The
First Amendment value at stake in the media physical injury cases inheres in
the special role that the media plays in its ability to widely disseminate and
amplify speech for the public's benefit, and the relationship of that role to
common law negligence principles.
B. The Speech Dissemination/Liabilty Factor: The Potentially Contrary
Relationship Between the Public Interest in the Widespread Dissemination of
First A mendment-Protected Speech, and Negligence Tort Law Princoles for
the Compensation of Physically-Injured Parties
Most of the media physical injury cases surveyed are brought, inter alia,
on a theory of negligence, either as a separate tort295 or as the alleged conduct
giving rise to other torts 2 96 A cause of action founded upon negligence, from
which liability will follow, requires: (1) a duty or obligation, recognized by the
law, that requires the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable risks; (2) a breach of that duty
(i.e. the failure to conform to that standard of conduct); (3) a reasonably close
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury, what is
(American scholars' right to hear speech by Belgian professor). Some commentators have
proposed that the Court should recognize a broader right to receive information that has a
personal value to either the listener or the speaker, including perhaps obscenity, for purposes of
"self-realization". See, e.g., Redish, supra note 282, at 593. However, the Supreme Court has
never officially endorsed this theory, and the Court has retrospectively narrowed the rationale for
the strongest case arguably pointing in the direction of such a broad approach. Compare Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (voiding statute punishing knowing possession of obscenity,
as applied to adult possessing obscenity in his home), with Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103
(1990) (possession of child pornography unprotected); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351(1971) (mailing of obscenity to consenting adults unprotected); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139 (1973) (same for transporting); and United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film,
413 U.S. 123 (1973) (same for importing).
294. See, e.g., The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713. Compare Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech not protected by the First Amendment),
with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 (consumers right to prescription drug
pricing information), and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 563 (commercial
speech constitutionally protected unless advertises unlawful goods or services or is fraudulent or
misleading). Compare Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (obscenity not protected by First Amendment), with
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 ("obscenity" confined to works which depict or describe sexual conduct,
and which lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value). Compare Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libellous speech not constitutionally protected), with Gertz,
418 U.S. 323, and Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
295. See, e.g., Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580; Bill, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr.
625; Zamora, 480 F. Supp. 199. Negligence has been recognized as a separate tort, an
independent basis for liability, since the early 19th century. See generally, PROSSER, supra note
157, at 160-61.
296. Negligent misrepresentation (see, e.g., Alm v. Van Nostrand, 480 N.E.2d 1263
(Ill. 1985), discussed supra at note 15); wrongful death by virtue of negligence (see, e.g.,
Weirum, 15 Cal.3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36, discussed supra at notes 39-44 & 52-
55; Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d 1067, discussed supra at notes 113-21; Braun, 749 F.Supp.
1083, discussed supra at notes 162-73; Eimann, 880 F.2d 830, discussed supra at notes 148-
59); negligent infliction of mental distress (see, e.g., Hyde, 637 S.W.2d 251, discussed supra at
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normally referred to as "proximate cause"; and (4) actual loss or damage
resulting to the interests of another.297
Negligence is conduct "which falls below the standard established by
law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."298 It may
be caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is
unaware of the results which may follow from his action. 299 Such was
arguably the case with the "balloon pellet" broadcast in Shannon300 and the
disc jockey's radio broadcast in Weirum.301 Alternatively, it may arise where
the responsible party weighed the possible consequences carefully, and
exercised what it considered to be its best judgment,302 as was probably the
case with the newspaper that revealed the victim's name in Hyde.
To be negligent, the conduct must be unreasonable in light of the rec-
ognizable risk.303 The graver or more serious the possible harm, the less the
probability or likelihood of the occurrence required to create a duty of care.304
All of the injuries presented by the cases under consideration were serious;
indeed, most of the cases are wrongful death actions. The least serious
injuries were the mental distress suffered by the plaintiffs in the Endangering
Revelation cases, Hyde and Times Mirror, and even there, more serious
consequences might have ensued.
What is novel and unusual about the speech-related, physical injury
negligence actions brought against the media is the factor of the probability or
likelihood of the harm. In the context of media broadcasts or other dissemina-
tion of speech, what might at most be characterized as a remote risk of harm
posed by the speech becomes multiplied a million-fold based on the number of
speech recipients. For example, sixteen million children were estimated to
have watched the broadcast of Disney's "Mickey Mouse Show," yet only the
Shannon child is known to have been injured.305 Perhaps the chance of self-
injury from blowing up a balloon with a pellet in it is remote; the chance of
serious injury even more remote; but, given the size of that audience, the
Georgia Supreme Court could not help but conclude that there had been a
foreseeable risk that someone, somewhere, would be seriously injured.306
A different but related problem of negligence tort actions against the
media is the potential for an unlimited class of plaintiffs. In the Erroneous
Instruction and Dangerous Instruction Cases, for example, given the potential
size of the audience, there is a potential for unlimited liability for either acci-
dental errors or misjudgments, predicated on a theory of negligent misrepre-
notes 131-38; Times Mirror, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, discussed supra at
notes 139-46).
297. PROSSER, supra note 157, § 30, at 164-65.
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
299. PROSSER, supra note 157, § 31, at 169.
300. See discussion supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
301. See discussion supra notes 39-44 & 52-55 and accompanying text.
302. PROSSER, supra note 157, § 31, at 169.
303. Id. at 170.
304. Id. at 171.
305. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, discussed supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
306. Id at 583.
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sentation. 307 Courts have historically placed limitations on defendants'
potential liability in negligent misrepresentation actions, but only when the
plaintiffs were claiming pecuniary losses in a business context.30 8 By com-
parison, courts might well be loath to limit recovery where plaintiffs seek to
recover for physical injuries, wrongful death, or emotional injury.
Thus, the broad dissemination of ideas and information which make the
mass media valuable to society from a First Amendment standpoint make
them potentially more vulnerable as defendants in common law negligence
actions, both in terms of the magnitude of the risk presented and the correla-
tive duty imposed, and in terms of the potential plaintiff class. The more
widely-disseminated the speech, the greater the potential tort liability exposure
(hereinafter, the "Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor").
Notably, in this regard, most309 of the media physical injury cases are
conceptually different from the defamation cases to which they have been
sometimes analogized for First Amendment purposes.310 In defamation law,
the size of the audience is generally irrelevant to meeting the pre-requisite
elements of the tort; publication to a single person would suffice.311 Moreover,
while the size of the audience to which the defamation is ultimately
disseminated might have some relevance -for purposes of pleading and proving
special damages, 312 both the number of potential plaintiffs, 313 and the general
damages which may be presumed by the fact-finder to have resulted from the
loss of reputation, 314 depend primarily upon the 6ontent of the defamatory
307. Misrepresentation in the form of misleading words frequently occurs in negligence
actions for personal injury or property damage, and is not ordinarily distinguished from other
types of negligence. PROSSER, supra note 157, § 105, at 725-26 & § 107, at 745.
308. See, e.g., Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986). See generally
PROSSER, supra note 157, § 107, at 745, n.61 (citing Justice Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares
Corp.v.Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)). New York precludes
plaintiffs from recovering against accountants and other professional information-providers for
negligent representation giving rise to pecuniary loss. See Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985). But see Rosenblum v.
Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
309. The Endangering Revelation cases are conceptually different, and might be better
analogized to the defamation cases. See discussion infra Section IV(b)(2).
310. See discussion, supra notes 248-78 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dep't. Store, 174 N.W.2d 765, 767 (Mich.
1970); Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 98 So. 290, 292 (Ala. 1923). See generally
PROSSER, supra note 157, § 113, at 798 ("There may be publication to any third person.")
(emphasis added).
312. Special damages consist of the loss of something having economic or pecuniary
value, which the plaintiff can specifically identify and trace its causation to the defamatory
statement. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 Cmt. b; PROSSER, supra
note 157, § 116A, at 844.
313. With respect to group libel, see generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
564A; PROSSER, supra note 157, at 784.
314. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904; PROSSER, supra note
157, § 116A, at 843.
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statement, the fact of its publication,3t 5 and the mens rea of the defendant in
publishing i1316
C. Speech Dissemination and Speech Origination: The Media's Dual Functions
in Bringing First A mendment-Protected Speech to the Public
In serving the public interests represented by the First Amendment, the
media serve two distinct functions. They disseminate speech and, often, they
originate speech. In most of the media physical injury cases herein surveyed,
the media defendants disseminated speech which they themselves had origi-
nated. In some cases, however, such as the Winter mushroom book publisher
case 317 and the Eimann "gun-for-hire" advertisement case,318 the media were
perceived as having disseminated speech which had been originated by
others; as having been the "neutral," albeit financially remunerated, transmit-
ters of speech. A third possibility is suggested by the Shannon balloon pellet
case, wherein defendant Disney had only originated the speech, having relied
on its fellow defendant, the Turner Broadcasting Corporation, to disseminate
the program to the public on its television station.
Where the media defendants both disseminated and originated the
speech which allegedly gave rise to physical injury, courts have tended to
focus exclusively on the content of the speech which the media originated,
inquiring whether it was First Amendment-protected under either a
Brandenburg clear and present danger or GertzlGreenmoss "of public/private
concern" analysis. 319 Both of these tests are content-focused. Not surpris-
ingly, it was in cases where the media defendants were perceived as having
only neutrally disseminated speech originated by others, such as Winter and
Eimann, that the courts focused on the functional role of the media as speech
disseminators, and its First Amendment value.
The Eimann case is particularly instructive. Again, the Fifth Circuit,
applying the balancing test of United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,32o con-
cluded that SOF, under the Texas common law of negligence, did not owe a
duty to the plaintiffs' decedent to screen advertisements that were at most
"facially innocuous" and "ambiguous" to determine whether they were offer-
315. See generally PROSSER, supra note 157, § 116A, at 843.
[I]n the absence of rebuttal testimony to show that the only recipients to whom the
defamatory matter was published did not believe it, the presumption [of
impairment of reputation] should continue to be applied, at least to libel which is
published publicly. Normally, the publication of false and defamatory matter
about the plaintiff is cirumstantial evidence in and of itself that there was some
impairment to reputation.
Il
316. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621, which took the position
that general damages should be recoverable only upon proof that the defamation had been
published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, even in cases where
the defamation concerned a private person in a matter of private concern. As such, the common
law extends the "malice" requirement beyond what would be constitutionally-required.
Compare Geriz, 418 U.S. 323, with Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749.
317. See discussion supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
318. See discussion supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
319. See discussion supra Section II(a) & (c).
320. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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ing criminal services. 321 The Carroll Towing test, formulated by Judge
Learned Hand, imposes a duty upon the defendant where the burden of taking
adequate precautions to overcome the dangerous condition is greater than the
probability of the injury risked, multiplied by the gravity of the injury risked.322
Applying this test, the Eimann court found that the ads in SOF repre-
sented "a serious threat of harm," 323 and that the risk presented was "more
than remote."324 On the other hand, the court found that the burden of pre-
venting that harm was too heavy for SOF to have been expected to bear, if
this prevention could only have been achieved by SOF's screening all of the
ads or not publishing any of them at all. In reaching this conclusion, the
Eimann court noted the pervasiveness of advertising in our society,325 as well
as "the important role of such communication for purposes of risk-benefit
analysis," 326 as highlighted by the Supreme Court's protection, albeit limited, of
commercial speech under the First Amendment.327
Thus, although the Eimann court did not reach the defendant's First
Amendment arguments, it incorporated First Amendment interests into the
Carroll Towing balancing test. Against a less than remote risk of serious
harm, the burden to be weighed encompassed not only the burden of precau-
tion imposed upon SOF and others similarly situated, but also, the damage to
the public's First Amendment-protected interests in receiving the commercial
speech that the imposition of so great a burden of precaution on the media
would entail.
Moreover, the Eimann court's use of First Amendment concerns in the
Carroll Towing test focused not merely on the content of the speech, but also,
significantly, on the functional role of the media in disseminating it. In this
respect, the Eimann court took a broader view of the issue than those courts
or judges which, on the constitutional question which Eimann avoided, used
only narrow, content-based analogies to Brandenburg or GertzlGreenmoss
defamation. Indeed, Eimann focused on the content of the speech only from
the broadest viewpoint: advertising is pervasive and important in our society
and is now generally protected under the First Amendment, even if not as
protected as other types of speech. There was no inquiry as to whether "gun-
for-hire" advertisements might be less socially valuable, or more inherently
suspect, than other types of advertisements. The public was entitled to
receive a wide spectrum of commercial speech.
Thus, Eimann's weighing of the public's First Amendment interests, in
determining that SOF should not be deemed negligent and liable for damages,
reflected two related concerns. The general concern was to protect the pub-
321. Eimann, 880 F.2d 830, 835-38.
322. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
323. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835.
324. Id. The court noted that of the approximately 2,000 personal service ads printed by
SOF between 1975 and 1984 (when the ad in question was run), the plaintiffs' evidence
established that as many as nine had served as links in criminal plots; that SOF staffers had aided
police investigations in two of these; and that other crimes had received media coverage. Id
325. l at 836.
326. Id
327. See discussion infra. notes 365-68 and accompanying text.
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lic's interest in receiving the messages - the ideas or information - con-
tained in First Amendment-protected speech (i.e. the advertisements). The
specific concern was to preserve the system by which this speech is dissemi-
nated; a system in which the media play a critical role. It is the public's inter-
est in the broad dissemination of First Amendment-protected speech, encom-
passing both of these concerns, that is the central focus of the Speech
Dissemination/Liability Factor previously described.
Eimann, again, involved a media defendant who had disseminated the
speech at issue, but had not originated it. The common law rule applied
therein might arguably be applicable only to media defendants comparably-sit-
uated, such as publisher G.P.Putnam's Sons in the Winter mushroom book
case. In contrast, in many of the physical injury cases surveyed, the media
were disseminating speech which they themselves originated. In such a case,
the fact that the media defendant was a speech originator as well as a speech
disseminator might well change the analysis of the ,duty of care which, under
the circumstances, it owed to the public or others. It might also change judi-
cial perception of how imposing liability on a iedia defendant in a given case
would impact upon the speech dissemination process.
Nevertheless, as the Eimann decision suggests, the public's interest is in
the broad dissemination of First Amendment-protected speech. A media
defendant that disseminated its own speech, rather than the speech of others,
was also serving that interest. So too, arguably, was even a "non-media"
defendant like Disney in the Shannon balloon pellet case, when it allowed its
speech to be widely disseminated by the media. Those who participate in the
speech dissemination process, or who originate speech for widespread media
dissemination, are serving the public's interest in receiving a broad variety of
First Amendment-protected speech. At the same time, these speech origina-
tors and disseminators increase their exposure to common law tort liability.
Even if the service to the public must be balanced against the harm that the
media have allegedly caused, the valuable First Amendment interests served
should still receive consideration.
Again, both the Brandenburg clear and present danger test and the
Gertz/Greenmoss "of public/private concern" distinction focus solely on the
speech content; specifically, on either its dangerous or social utilitarian nature.
They do not focus on the functional role of the media as the disseminator of
First Amendment-protected speech, both the media's own speech and that of
others. 328 Furthermore, they do not consider the Speech Dissemina-
tion/Liability Factor, that is, the potentially contrary relationship between that
328. Because the analogy between media physical injury cases and the
GertzlGreenmoss defamation categorizations is drawn solely on the basis of content, i.e. the "of
public concern/private concern" distinction, it is not germaine to the present discussion that the
Gertz court flirted with the possibility of limiting the protection of its holdings to media, as
opposed to non-media, defendants. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 366-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986).
Subsequently, in the Greenmoss decision, at least five of the judges explicitly rejected the
distinction drawn in Gertz between media and non-media defendants. See Greenmoss, 472
U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring); 472 U.S. at 782-83 n.7 & 783-84 n.9 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court may now consider the question an open one. See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706 n.6 (1990).
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constitutionally favored speech dissemination process and common law
negligence principles. The proposed solution is a calibrated balancing test in
which all of these factors are taken into consideration.
D. An Alternative Approach. A First Amendment Balancing Test Based on
Dennis v. United States
The recognition of the First Amendment value of the media's functional
role, and the correlative enhanced risk of tort liability, might justify a possible
constitutional intervention in these cases. The potential contrariness, between
what is constitutionally valued and what is correspondingly more tort-suscep-
tible, should create a presumption in favor of First Amendment protection for
media defendants in the physical injury cases. This presumption could, how-
ever, be strengthened or rebutted when a number of other factors, including
the social value or utility of the speech, are considered and weighed.329
The "clear and present danger" test of Dennis v. United States330 could
provide the basis for such a constitutional standard, along the lines suggested
by the Eimann court's use of Carroll Towing. Under the Dennis test,
appropriately derived by Judge Learned Hand, author of the Carroll Towing
negligence formula, courts are to ask in each case "whether the gravity of the
'evil' [that might be caused by the speech], discounted by its improbability,justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 331
The Dennis test, like that of Carroll Towing and unlike that of Brandenburg, is
a balancing test rather than a "bright-line" test. Unlike Brandenburg, there is
no requirement of either "advocacy" of or "incitement" to "unlawful" action;
the focus is rather on the gravity of the danger and its likelihood. Also, unlike
Brandenburg, neither imminence nor intent are required by the Dennis test.
Free of the ultra-protective, highly restrictive language of Brandenburg, and
employing a formula that balances danger and risk in a way correlative to and
reminiscent of the common law negligence principles from which Judge Hand
might well have derived it, the Dennis test offers an ideal, flexible foundation
for a unified, broad-based approach to the media physical injury cases.
Preliminarily, however, a potential problem must be addressed. The
Dennis test, as it stands, offers courts little guidance in balancing the compet-
ing interests in media physical injury cases. Indeed, given its broad terms,
there would be considerable potential for unbridled, ad hoc balancing. 332 The
Supreme Court has, however, established a precedent and model for cali-
brating the Dennis test.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,333 the Court used the Dennis
formula to articulate a standard for determining the permissibility of an injunc-
tion against pre-trial publicity in a criminal trial.334 In order to balance the
329. For an identification and discussion of these factors, see infra Part IV.
330. 183 F.2d 201, discussed supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
331. Id at 212.
332. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454-55 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 109-10 (1980).
333. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
334. See Nebraska Press Association, 427 U.S. at 562-70.
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criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, as well as the gov-
ernment's interest in prosecuting law-breakers, against the First Amendment
rights of the press and its audience, Stuart directs the trial judge to examine:
(1) the nature and extent of pre-trial coverage; (2) the likely effectiveness of
alternative means of restricting pretrial publicity (such as changing venue);
and (3) the likely effectiveness of a prior restraint in preventing prejudice to
the defendant.3 35 Moreover, the Stuart standard looks to see how broad, and
therefore, how invasive of First Amendment interests, the proposed gag order
i0.336
Stuart demonstrates that a principled and consistent approach to balanc-
ing First Amendment rights against competing governmental and individual
interests, based upon the Dennis formula, is possible. Moreover, it attests that
Dennis survives as a viable precedent notwithstanding the later Brandenburg
decision which, arguably, superseded it, at least in the context of the advocacy
of unlawful action cases. 337
The question remaining is how to calibrate Dennis in the context of the
media physical injury cases. Notably, Stuart involved the calibration of Dennis
in order to assess the wisdom of issuing a gag order, a form of prior restraint.
Although normally deemed more constitutionally suspect than other burdens
upon free speech, 338 a prior restraint at least would not chill media speech
through self-censorship. 339 It is no doubt the fear of such self-censorship that
has made the Brandenburg test an attractive "safe harbor" in so many of the
media physical injury cases, even if it is sometimes over-protective and is
often poorly analogized. Any calibrated balancing test based on Dennis which
is offered as a substitute for Brandenburg in the media physical injury cases
should therefore be initially weighted in the media's favor, starting with a pre-
sumption of protection based upon the Speech Dissemination/Liability
Factor.340 Part IV, which follows, considers the factors that should be weighed
in a balancing test, and how that test might be structured.
IV. A PROPOSED BALANCING TEST: FACTORS AND
STRUCTURE
The primary purpose of this section is to identify the factors that would
be properly considered in a calibrated balancing test designed to determine
whether the First Amendment should protect a media defendant in a speech-
related physical injury case, and to suggest the kind of weight that these fac-
tors should be given. It also suggests a possible structure for such a test, and
identifies the various relevant factors in the context of that structure.
There are probably numerous possible structures for a balancing test
that would be appropriate in the media physical injury cases. The structure
335. See id.
336. See id,
337. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454-55 (Douglas, J., concurring).
338. See The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717-20 (1931).
339. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr-., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE LJ. 409,
429-30 (1983).
340. See discussion supra notes 305-28 and accompanying text.
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suggested herein is set forth for purposes of illustration and discussion only, in
the hope that judicial experimentation in future cases, along the lines sug-
gested, will lead to further refinement and innovation.
Sub-part "A" of Part IV describes a preliminary inquiry that must be
made before any balancing test commences: whether the subject speech was
categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.
Sub-part "B" describes an initial phase ("the First Level") of a balanc-
ing test, in which the inquiry is whether the defendant in a speech-related
physical injury case deserves to have weighed in its favor an initial presump-
tion against liability predicated on the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor
previously described. 341 Whether that presumption will stand, be weakened, or
be fully rebutted requires the consideration of a number of factors focusing on
the specific facts of the case and on the defendant's conduct, some of this
analysis tracking that of common law negligence.
Sub-part "C" describes the second and final phase ("the Second
Level") of the balancing test, to determine whether the First Amendment
should intervene to forestall a negligence judgment against the defendant.
Here, the presumption in favor of media protection based on the Speech
Dissemination/Liability Factor - if it has survived the First Level of the bal-
ancing test - is weighed in conjunction with other factors which might favor
non-liability.
A. Preliminary Inquiry: Was the Speech Categorically Unprotected by the
First A mendndnt?
If the physical injuries were allegedly caused by media speech which,
based upon its content, is found not to have been First Amendment-protected
speech, a constitutional defense in a civil tort case could not stand.
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of categories of
speech that are beyond the shelter of the First Amendment, and the prelimi-
nary inquiry in each case should be whether or not the subject speech falls
into one of these categories. Thus, speech which constitutes advocacy of
unlawful action and satisfies the tough clear and present danger standards of
Brandenburg would have no First Amendment protection. 342 Nor would a
constitutional defense stand if injuries resulted from speech that would meet
the constitutional definition of "obscenity." 343
The advertisement of unlawful products or services also has no First
Amendment protection.3 44 Any advertisement expressly offering such
products or services could not have the benefit of a First Amendment defense
in a civil action for physical injuries that allegedly resulted therefrom. The
341. See id
342. See discussion supra notes 200-30 and accompanying text.
343. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), discussed supra, note 261.
Notably, Judge Jones, in her concurrence/dissent in Herceg, believed that this issue had not yet
been adjudicated. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1025 (Jones, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part), discussed supra, notes 248-66 and accompanying text.
344. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Ser. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-
64 (1980) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388(1973)).
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same would be true of any advertisement which was fraudulent or misleading,
as this too is a category excluded from First Amendment protection. 5
In Braun and Norwood, the Criminal Advertisement casesY 6 the courts
went a step further and concluded that there could be no First Amendment
protection because the "gun-for-hire" ads in Soldier of Fortune, while not
explicit on the point, could easily have been interpreted as offering unlawful
services.347 Assuming that these were correct interpretations and applications
of the Supreme Court's precedents delineating the scope of constitutionally
unprotected commercial speech, 348 the First Amendment defense would be
unavailable in civil actions for physical injury or wrongful death alleged to
have resulted from these and similar advertisements.
The power of a state to ban an activity outright includes the "lesser
power" to permit the activity but ban or regulate advertisements thereof. 349
Assume, for example, that it would be constitutional for a state, in the name of
public safety, to limit gun-for-hire employment to individuals who are regis-
tered with a state agency.350 Further assume that a state implementing such a
registration program made it unlawful for unregistered individuals to engage in
gun-for-hire advertising of any type within the state. If such a prohibited ad by
an unregistered individual were to result in physical injuries to a third party,
the First Amendment might be unavailable as a defense for the media
defendant in the ensuing civil action. This might be true even if the unlawful
ad was more like the one found to be "innocuous" in Eimann, and less like the
ones found to be easily interpreted as offering criminal services in Braun and
Norwood. Indeed, it might be true even if the unlawful ad specifically
disclaimed an intention to engage in unlawful activities. 3 5'
345. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 567 n.10 (citing Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding Texas statute which prohibited the practice of
optometry under a trade name)).
346. See discussion supra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
347. See Braun, 749 F. Supp. 1083, 1086; Norwood, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1401. For a
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
348. See Braun, 749 F. Supp. at 1086 (relying on Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S.
376). In Pittsburgh Press Co., the Court upheld the Human Relations Commission's order
banning the practice of placing job opening advertisements under columns headed "Jobs - Male
Interest" and "Jobs - Female Interest" discrimination on the basis'of sex unlawful. The Court
found that these ads, as placed in labelled columns, proposed unlawful discrimination, and
therefore the First Amendment did not apply. 413 U.S. at 388.
349. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328, 346 (1986) (Puerto Rico could have prohibited casino gambling by its residents, therefore
it could constitutionally ban advertising for such gambling directed at its residents, even where it
permitted such advertising to be directed at non-residents.).
350. While this assumption no doubt can be safely made, the precise constitutional
limitations on a state's ability to proscribe a product or an activity remain unclear. The Court has
been reluctant to strike down state economic regulations as being violative of either the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (see, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117,125, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)), or of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause (see,
e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976), overruling Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957)), requiring in both instances only a "rational" basis for the enactment.
351. This is theoretically true, but as a practical matter, the rule might prove unduly
burdensome for First Amendment purposes, where media coverage spills over from one state to
1992]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
B. The Balancing Test - First LeveL In determining whether there should be
Frust Amendment protectiob should the Speech Dissemination'Liability Factor
be weighed in the defendant's favor, given the spec/ic facts of the case?
1. An initial presumption in favor of media protection based on the
Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor
A priori, the public has a right to hear all First Amendment-protected
speech, no matter how highly valued the message is from a categorical stand-
point, and no matter how trivial the specific subject matter. The media play a
crucial First Amendment role in disseminating and magnifying the speech for
the public, but again, that very process enhances the media's potential expo-
sure to tort liability for negligently inflicting physical injuries: under common
law negligence principles, both the scope of the media speaker's duty of care,
and the potential plaintiff class if there is error or misjudgment, expand as the
audience enlarges (the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor). Where the
First Amendment values and common law negligence principles are poten-
tially in conflict, there should be an initial presumption of media protection
where, a posteriori, someone is injured, allegedly as a result of the speech.
Again, it has been argued that the flaw in the constitutional analogies
presently being used by courts in the media physical injury cases is that they
focus exclusively on the content of the subject speech, and fail to take into
account either the functional role that the media in general serve in the wide
dissemination of First Amendment-protected speech, or the correlative risks
that the media take because of the potential contrariness of common law neg-
ligence principles. Therefore, the First Level of the proposed balancing test
considers whether the functional role that the media generally play in the
broad dissemination of First Amendment-protected speech, notwithstanding
the attendant risks (the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor), should be
weighed in favor of the media defendant in the case at hand.
Although the Speech/Dissemination Liability Factor is related to the
broader constitutional question of whether imposing liability in a given case
will chill First Amendment speech by others in the future, 352 its consideration
at the First Level of the balancing test focuses specifically on the question of
fairness to the defendant in the case at hand. Thus, while the First Level of
the balancing test begins with a presumption in the media defendant's favor
based on the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor, this presumption may be
weakened or rebutted by consideration of a number of factors specific to the
case.
In some cases, for example, given the identiflability of the potential
plaintiffs in advance, arguably the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor is not
significantly implicated and should -have little impact. In other cases, it may be
determined that the media defendant should have realized that whatever func-
tional value inhered in the wide dissemination of the First Amendment speech
at issue, such value would be outweighed by the significant risk to the public
another, as in broadcasting. Query whether it would be fair to ask the media to police the
registration status of persons offering gun-for-hire services.
352. See discussion supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text, and infra Part IV(c)(2).
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that the speech dissemination posed. This would be determined by weighing
various factors applicable to the case, in an analysis which to some degree
tracks that of common law negligence,
In other words, the significance of the Speech Dissemination/Liability
Factor cannot be assessed in isolation from the defendant's conduct. Thus,
after consideration of a number of identified factors, the presumption favoring
protection predicated on the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor might be
weakened by strong evidence of negligence or even totally rebutted by a
court's determination that the evidence could support a fact-finding of gross
negligence on the defendant's part.
2. Was a specific potential plaintiff identifiable in advance of the speech?
This is one of the most important factors to be considered at the First
Level. If a specific potential plaintiff is identifiable in advance, as in
Endangering Revelation cases like Hyde and Times Mirror, then a strong pre-
sumption in favor of media protection cannot be premised on the Speech
Dissemination/Liability Factor. If the potential plaintiff, the individual to whom
the duty is owed, is. identifiable in advance, then the possible danger to that
individual - and the media's correlative duty - is not an unknown conse-
quence of projecting the speech to the public. The potential for injury and for
media liability are there from the start, albeit the gravity of the injury and the
scope of media liability may be unknown.
In Hyde and Times Mirror, for example, the newspapers knew or
should have known that the plaintiff crime victim or crime witness would suf-
fer emotional injury from the threat of physical harm if they printed her name
while the assailant was still at-large. What the newspapers would not have
known for sure was whether the assailant would read or learn the information,
and if so, whether he would take action upon it to the physical injury or death
of the witness.
The better analogy to the Endangering Revelation cases," therefore, may
be the First Amendment treatment of the defamation cases. The particular
individuals to whom the duty is owed are known when the media disseminates
information about them, although the potential scope of the liability may not be.
In the Endangering Revelation cases, as in the defamation cases, any pre-
sumption in favor of First Amendment protection must rest not on the Speech
Dissemination/Liability Factor, but in the "quality" of the speech that was dis-
seminated. In the Endangering Revelation cases, for example, the answer
may turn on whether the victim/witness' name is a matter "of public concern"
when the fact of the crime is a matter "of public concern." 353
Most types of media physical injury cases differ from the Endangering
Revelation cases, in that the potential plaintiffs are not identifiable in advance.
Still, the initial presumption in favor of protection based on the Speech
Dissemination/Liability Factor can be rebutted when, taking a number of othei
factors into consideration, the conclusion is that the media defendant should
353. See, e.g., Ross v. Midest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989). See also The Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524; Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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nevertheless be deemed responsible for the consequences of the speech.
These factors include whether the media defendant knew of or should have
foreseen the danger; the gravity of the danger; how the speech recipient was
led to engage, or came to engage, in the activity dangerous to himself or
others; how obvious the danger was or should have been to the speech recipi-
ent; and whether the media participated in the origination of the speech, or
only disseminated it.
These factors are examined in the discussion which follows. If a con-
sideration and balancing of these factors would lead a court to the conclude
that the media defendant could not be found negligent under traditional tort
principles, the court might grant summary judgment without recourse to the
First Amendment. If, however, the evidence might support a jury verdict for
negligence, the court might let the presumption stand, calibrating its strength
according to its analysis of these factors. If, having considered these factors,
the court felt that the evidence might support a verdict for gross negligence,
the presumption of protection raised by the Speech Dissemination/Liability
Factor might be deemed totally rebutted.
3. Did the media speaker know of, or should the media
speaker have foreseen, the danger? and
4. How grave was the danger?
These two interrelated questions closely track the Dennis formula as
well as common law negligence principles. The greater the danger, and the
greater degree of actual or imputed knowledge thereof on the media speaker's
part, the weaker the presumption of media protection. Notwithstanding the
First Amendment interests in the speech being disseminated and received, the
media speaker should have realized that the danger-posed might outweigh the
value of the speech.
Part of the problem in this part of the analysis is determining what the
"danger" refers to in specific cases, both with respect to gravity and foresee-
ability. In Shannon, for example, where millions of children were urged to
blow-up balloons with BB pellets inside, there was a high risk that many bal-
loons were going to explode; probably some considerable risk of numerous
minor injuries; but a much lower risk that any serious, let alone mortal, injury
would result therefrom. In Herceg, on the other hand, there was a very high
risk of mortality if any single individual attempted "auto-erotic asphyxiation,"
but a much lower risk that any individual would be foolish enough to attempt it.
For purposes of this part of the analysis, the "gravity of the danger, dis-
counted by its improbability" must take a collective, cumulative, societal-level
view of the possible impact of the speech. Thus, a judge could reasonably
conclude that a foreseeable, high-probability risk of serious but non-mortal
injuries to a large number of children in Shannon should serve to rebut the
presumption of media protection as strongly as the lower probability-risk of
fatal injury to one or two persons in Herceg.
The gravity and foreseeability of the danger factors should serve to bol-
ster the presumption of media protection in the Erroneous Instruction cases
where the activities were not inherently dangerous.
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5. How was the speech recipient led to engage, or how did he come to
engage, in the activity dangerous to himself and/or others?
The more strongly the media speaker urges the speech recipient to
engage in an activity for which at least some degree of danger was or should
have been anticipated by the media speaker, the more strongly it should weigh
as a factor rebutting the presumption of protection. The strongest type of
urging described herein has been referred to as "exhortation" and is exempli-
fied by the Weirum case.354 Notably, the Brandenburg clear and present
danger test looked only for this high degree of urging, there equated with
"advocacy" of or "incitement" to imminent unlawful action.3 55 Again,
Brandenburg's stringent requirements need not be met in the context of this
balancing test.3 56 Exhortation to an inherently and obviously dangerous
activity, as in Weirum and perhaps in the Subliminal Exhortation cases, should
suffice to rebut the presumption of protection.
While far less forceful than exhortations, instructions are also implicitly
an invitation to engage in the activity, and may, as in Shannon, be accompa-
nied by some additional active encouragement. Cases like Herceg remain dif-
ficult to categorize here because instructions are being given with warnings
not to follow them.
Where the media is alleged only to have "inspired" activity that was
dangerous or injurious to the speech recipient or others, either through imita-
tion or through inducement to a psychological mood shift, the media is least
culpable, having never intended that any action be taken by the speech recipi-
ent. If this is true for the Imitation Cases, it should be even more true for the
Mood Shift Cases. The presumption of protection should stand unless one of
the other factors cited is extraordinarily adverse to this result.
6. Was the danger obvious to the speech recipient?
This factor is particularly important in the Instruction Cases. As
Shannon illustrates, where the danger of an activity is not as obvious to the
speech recipient as it was or should have been to the media speaker, invitation
by way of instruction might be almost as culpable as exhortation to an obvi-
ously dangerous activity. In this situation, the factor weighs strongly towards
rebutting the presumption of protection.
Conversely, if the danger was or should have been obvious to speech
recipients who nevertheless engaged in the activity, that might be a factor
bolstering the presumption in favor of media protection. While this should not
be a significant factor in an Exhortation Case like Weirum, it might have been
helpful to Hustler's defense in the Herceg case. Hustler's argument would be
that, in addition to its warnings not to attempt the described technique, it could
354. See discussion supra notes 39-44 & 52-55 and accompanying text.
355. See discussion supra notes 200-30 and accompanying text.
356. See discussion supra Part I11(d).
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have reasonably relied on the danger of strangulation being obvious to anyone
old enough to read and follow the instructions. 357
7. Did the media defendant participate in the origination of the subject
speech, or was it only a "neutral disseminator" of the speech of others?
In the "how to" instruction book cases, like the Winter mushroom case,
the courts have drawn a distinction between the book author, who originates
the speech, and the book publisher, who disseminates it. The courts have
imposed no liability on the latter as a matter of common law, and have sug-
gested that to do otherwise would pose First Amendment problems. 358 The
same protection has been accorded to newspaper and magazine publishers for
357. The current best-seller, Final Exit, is a book which offers instructions on how to
commit suicide, expressly disclaiming the advocacy thereof. Not yet the subject of litigation, it
is nevertheless interesting to speculate on how an action for wrongful death, based on a
hypothetical decedent's having purportedly used this or a similar book to commit suicide, might
be approached under the proposed balancing test. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT (1991).
Those inclined to be speech-protective without reaching the First Amendment might well
argue the lack of proximate cause by virtue of intervening causation in the free-willed decision of
the suicide. Based on current tort law principles, this latter argument might be decisive. This is
not absolutely certain, however, particularly where causation-in-fact (e.g. but for the
suggestions in defendant's book, the decedent lacked the nerve to commit the deed, or did not
believe that it could be performed "with dignity") could be proven. The closest analogy is the
question whether one who physically injures another, leading to the victim's mental impairment
or depression, in turn resulting in suicide, should be responsible for the fatal act. The older and
apparently still predominant rule answers the question in the negative, except where the original
accident had left the victim insane, emphasizing the free-willed suicide decision of the sane
victim as the intervening cause of death. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
455; PROSSER, supra note 157, § 44, at 311. However, some recent decisions have placed
greater emphasis on foreseeability and traceability to reach different results. See, e.g., Fuller v.
Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 322 N.E.2d 263 (1974); Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal.
App.2d 898, 5 Cal Rptr. 28 (1960).
Still, the argument in the suicide instruction book case would have to be based
exclusively on foreseeability; unlike the personal injury leading to suicide case, the author's
common law duty to the suicide victim is not clear. Moreover, aside from the issues of
proximate cause and duty, some judges might conclude that it was not "negligent" to publish a
book of this sort, even if it were foreseeable that it might be the decisive factor in the decision of
some individuals to commit suicide.
Assume, however, for the sake of argument, that a court felt constrained to reach the
First Amendment issue in such a case. Those inclined to be speech-protective might argue that
this would be an ideal case for Brandenburg's "safe harbor": even if the test were stretched to
cover an activity that was self-destructive, if not unlawful, there is still no advocacy or
incitement here. See discussion supra notes 200-30 & 338-40 and accompanying text.
The same result of non-liability for wrongful death, however, could and should be
readily reached by using the balancing test proposed herein. This would be achieved in part by
emphasizing, in the First Level of the balancing test, the last two factors discussed: that unlike
Weirum, this is a case of instruction, not one of exhortation; and that, as an instruction case, it is
one where the dangers are obvious to adult readers, unlike the dangers posed to the children in
the Shannon balloon pellet case or to the users of erroneous "how to" instruction books. The
Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor would not be rebutted and would weigh in the defendant's
favor. Moreover, in the Second Level of the balancing test, discussed infra Part IV(c), it may be
be strongly argued that instructions on how to commit suicide, like the abstract advocacy of
suicide as a solution to some of life's problems, are a combination of information and ideas that
are highly-relevant in today's marketplace of ideas. As such, both the abstract theory and the
specific instructions are "of public concern", and are therefore, unlike Hustler's autoerotic
asphyxiation article as viewed by Judge Jones in Herceg, of a highly-protected order in any
potential hierarchy or ranking of First Amendment speech.
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the "neutral transmittal" of advertisements without endorsement, as in the
Eimann gun-for-hire case.359 The speech disseminators are recognized as
being in a poorer position to exercise due care than are the speech originators.
By the same logic, where the media defendant is found to have been a
"neutral disseminator" of the speech of others that purportedly led to injury,
this should be a factor supporting the constitutional presumption of protection.
This would be true in a gun-for-hire advertisement case like Eimann,36o again
assuming that the ads are not readily interpreted as offering unlawful goods or
services, as was found to be the case in Braun and in Norwood.361
This factor would also weigh strongly against media liability in
Erroneous Instruction Cases where the media defendant was not the preparer
or originator of the instructional programming, but was merely a "neutral dis-
seminator" of the information, and nothing in the nature of the instructions
suggested the danger. By comparison, if the media is a "neutral transmitter"
of instructions to inherently dangerous activities, not exhorting participation in
the activity, this factor might still weigh in the media defendant's favor,
although not as heavily as in the Erroneous Instruction Cases. In Shannon, a
Dangerous Instruction Case, defendant Disney was not the speech transmit-
ter, but rather, the speech originator; therefore this factor should not have
weighed in its favor.362 Rather, the factor should have weighed in favor of co-
defendant Turner Broadcasting Corporation, which transmitted Disney's
program.
In determining whether to accord a media defendant the benefit of the
"neutral dissemination" factor, courts should remain flexible in defining
"neutrality." The media's profit motivation, for example, should not preclude a
finding of "neutral disssemination." Publishers profit from printing authors'
books, as do magazines and newspapers from printing ads, yet both are cor-
rectly treated as neutral transmitters by the courts. Similarly, the employment
status of the author might not alone be deemed determinative. In Herceg,363
the inquiry should not turn on whether the author of an article on autoerotic
asphyxiation for Hustler was technically an employee of the journal or a free-
lance writer; the transmission of the article would have been doubtfully
"neutral" in either case.
While "neutral" dissemination should be viewed as a positive factor
supporting the media defendant's presumption of constitutional protection, the
absence thereof should not be viewed as dispositive for its rebuttal. The vast
majority of the journalism and broadcast media are acting as speech origina-
tors as well as speech disseminators. That they originated the speech might
be relevant as to whether they exercised appropriate care under the circum-
stances, but this should be only one of the factors to be weighed in determin-
358. See discussion supra, notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
359. See discussion supra, notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
360. Seeid
361. Again, if such were the case, the ads would be categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection. See discussion supra, notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
362. See discussion supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
363. See discussion supra notes 90-96 & 248-65 and accompanying text.
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ing whether they have the benefit of the constitutional presumption based on
the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor.
C. The Balancing Test- Second Level Weighing the Arguments in Favor of
First Amendment Protection
At the First Level of the balancing rest, the objective was to see
whether a presumption in favor of constitutional protection predicated on the
Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor would be weakened or rebutted by an
assessment of various factors. Some factors, such as the identifiability of the
plaintiff in advance, might suggest that the presumption of protection was con-
ceptually ill-founded, while a consideration of all of the factors might suggest
such extreme negligence on the part of the media defendant that it should not
have the benefit of the presumption at all.
If, however, a strong or weaker presumption of constitutional protection
has survived the First Level of the balancing test, it can be weighed in con-
junction with two other considerations relevant to whether or not First
Amendment protection should be extended to the media defendant in a given
case.
1. Categorized according to its content, is the speech at issue entitled to
receive special constitutional protection, or less constitutional protection,
compared to First Amendment-protected speech generally? ("the
Content Categorization Factor").
The Supreme Court historically has focused on the distinction between
speech that was constitutionally protected and categories of speech that were
deemed unprotected on the basis of content. More recently, however, the
Court has suggested gradations of protection among various categories of
First Amendment speech, correlative to the perception that some types of
speech have greater quality or social utility than others.
For many years, of course, the Court had recognized that speech that
was of special value in the political decision-making process, often referred to
as "core" First Amendment speech, required special protection. 364 More
recently, as the umbrella of First Amendment protection has expanded, erod-
ing categories of speech once deemed constitutionally unprotected, the Court
has suggested that the newly constitutionalized speech might be accorded a
somewhat lesser degree of First Amendment protection than other First
Amendment speech.
Commercial speech, for example, which had been deemed totally
unprotected by the First Amendment prior to the 1970's,365 is today recognized
as protected. 366 Government may, however, burden commercial speech for
"important" reasons, 367 whereas traditionally, only "compelling" reasons had
364. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assoc., 11 S.Ct. 1950, 1960 (1991); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
365. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
366. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. 557; Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
367. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 568-69.
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been held to justify content-based restrictions on First Amendment-protected
speech. 368 Similarly, the current test for what is constitutionally unprotected as
"obscenity" 369 probably delineates a smaller category of unsheltered speech
than would have been subject to government proscription when the Court first
constitutionalized the area.370 Nevertheless, in recent cases, the Court has
suggested that some of the newly protected pornography, bordering on
categorically-unprotected "obscenity," may be entitled to less protection than
other, more socially utlitiarian forms of speech.371
Again, the media defendant should start with a presumption of First
Amendment protection when it is disseminating First Amendment-protected
speech. This is in part because the public has a strong interest in receiving a
broad panoply of ideas and information, without fine, subjective quality-judg-
ments about the social utility or preferential status of the type of speech
transmitted. The initial question, at the First Level, is to assess how strong or
weak that presumption is, given the specific facts of the case and weighing a
number of different factors. Where the Supreme Court has indicated that the
category of the subject speech deserves more or less protection than other
First Amendment-protected speech, such categorization of the speech accord-
ing to its content should be taken into consideration only a posteriori.372
In the Endangering Revelation cases, for example, it was noted at the
First Level of the balancing test that the identifiability of the potential plaintiff
in advance of the speech would undermine much of the rationale for the pre-
sumption of protection based on the Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor.
Moreover, any presumption remaining in the media's favor would be further
undermined because of the gravity of the danger and the media's advance
awareness thereof.
Nevertheless, the media's defense in an Endangering Revelation Case is
that the facts about the crime, including the name of the victim/witness, are
matters "of public concern". Speech fitting this classification has been
accorded increased First Amendment protection in defamation cases373 and
elsewhere. 374 If the Supreme Court were to hold that the name of the
368. See Osborne, 495 U.S. 103; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568, n.ll (1969).
369. See Miller, 413 U.S. 15, discussed supra, note 261.
370. See Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
371. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theater, 111 S.Ct., 2456, 2460 (1991) ("[live] nude
dancing ... is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, [but] only
marginally so."). Cf Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding
municipal zoning ordinances which discriminated against theaters exhibiting "adult," sexually
explicit, but not "obscene," motion pictures).
372. Learned Hand's Dennis test focuses on the danger posed by the speech - its
gravity and probability - and not on the social utility or quality of a particular type of speech.
However, the preservation of First Amendment values is the very ratio vivendi for the Dennis
test; the broader questions about how those values are served should certainly be factored into
this calibration of that test for use in the physical injury cases.
373. Compare Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, with Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749, discussed supra,
at notes 248-78 and accompanying text.
374. Compare Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), with Connick v..
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See generally Estlund, supra note 249.
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victim/witness were a matter "of public concern" even when the assailant is
still at-large, then the higher categorical "rating" of constitutional protection
for the speech based upon its social utility might off-set the low presumption of
protection established at the First Level of the balancing test.
By comparison to the media defendants in the Endangering Revelation
cases, Hustler, the media defendant in Herceg, would have come out of the
First Level of the balancing test with a rather strong presumption of protec-
tion. The Speech Dissemination/Liability Factor worked strongly in its favor:
the pornography was presumptively protected as "non-obscene"; 375 the public
had a right and an interest in receiving it; millions of readers had apparently
wanted the "information" and whatever stimulation the "idea" offered.
Providing so many persons with the information might have posed a risk that
someone in the audience would disobey the warnings, but this could not have
been foreseen with certainty. While the danger of the activity, if attempted,
was grave indeed, this should have been apparent to the speech recipient as
well, and should have served as a further deterrent.376
Judge Jones argued, on the other hand, that because of the content of
the speech - pornography at best "bordering" on obscenity - it should have
been given lesser constitutional protection, specifically in the context of physi-
cal injury suits. There are now more Supreme Court precedents suggesting
the creation of such a "lesser protected" category. 377 If the Supreme Court
had more definitively identified border-line obscenity as a lesser protected-
category of First Amendment speech prior to Hustler's publication of the auto-
erotic asphyxiation article, that would have made for a stronger counter-
weight to what was arguably a strong constitutional presumption in Hustler's
favor. Given the Supreme Court's clearer stance on this point, a future defen-
dant in a similar case might suffer a different judgment.
As for commercial speech, its lower formal First Amendment standing
and protection level have already been noted. 378 However, as the Eimann
court properly recognized, 379 this lower ranking does not negate the enormous
In Pickering, the dismissal of a high school teacher for publicly criticizing the board of
education on its allocation of school funds between athletics and education, and its methods for
informing taxpayers of the need for additional revenue, was held impermissible under the First
Amendment because the subject of the speech was "a matter of legitimate public concern." 391
U.S. at 571-72.
In Connick, an assistant district attorney threatened with transfer to another department
circulated an inter-office questionnaire concerning, inter alia, office transfer policy and office
morale. For this act, she was discharged for insubordination. The Court, distinguishing
Pickering, held that most of the speech in the questionnaire was not that of a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but rather, that of an employee upon matters of private interest. Id. at 147-49.
Such speech, the Court concluded, might be entitled to some First Amendment protection by
way of administrative action, but did not require federal court orders to protect a fundamental
right. Id. at 146-47.
375. Notably, Judge Jones did not feel that this issue had yet been adjudicated. See
Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1026 (Jones, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
376. See discussion supra Part IV(b)(6).
377. See supra notes 292-96 & 371 and accompanying text.
378. See discussion supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
379. See discussion supra notes 320 and accompanying text.
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social utility of commercial speech, and its prevalent and essential role in
society. The Eimann court properly treated the lower constitutional ranking of
commercial speech as a secondary factor given the likely damage to the
media's function in disseminating commercial speech if it were effectively
forced - on threat of tort liability - to investigate or to drop ads that might
lead to the sale of unlawful services.380 It is the impact of a court's decision in
creating and imposing future duties of care on the media, and the possible
chilling effect on First Amendment speech, that is the final consideration to be
weighed at the Second Level of the balancing test.
2. If there is no First Amendment bar to the desired civil sanction, how
invasive, chilling or otherwise damaging might imposing liability be to thefnctional role of the media in the future? ("the Chilling Effects
Factor").
This factor looks not only to the communication at issue in the suit, but
also to the broader question of what media speech might be chilled in the
future if liability were found. Sometimes, the imposition of liability would not
be terribly invasive of the media's role. In Hyde and Times Mirror, for exam-
ple, only the media's ability to publish the names of crime witness/victims was
at stake; imposing liability for that would not significantly chill the media's vig-
orous reporting of crimes. If the line drawn in the gun-for-hire cases were
between the protection of an "innocuous" ad in Eimann and no protection for
the clearly more suggestive ads in Braun and Norwood, imposing liability in
the latter cases would not have a major chilling effect upon the media's role in
general or even upon this specific type of.commercial speech.
By comparison, in the Inspiration Cases, this factor would militate
strongly in favor of First Amendment protection. The artistic, creative speech
which frequently is the subject of the Inspiration Cases would be seriously
chilled if liability were imposed where one speech recipient among millions has
an unexpected and unintended reaction.
In the Instruction Cases, the effect of denying First Amendment protec-
tion would impact only on the originators of instructional speech. Again, there
is, at least at present, an established common law jurisprudence protecting
media defendants who are merely transmitting dangerous or erroneous
instructions. Denying First Amendment protection to the originators of dan-
gerous media-transmitted instructions, such as Disney in Shannon, would not
seem a serious consequence. In the case of "erroneous" instructions, on the
other hand, it would be difficult for the media to protect itself short of eliminat-
ing a broad range of instructional speech.
Whether the media defendant was the neutral disseminator of the
speech, previously noted as relevant in determining whether, the defendant had
less of a duty of care than a media defendant who originated the speech, is
also relevant in this part of the analysis. As suggested by the Eimann court,
where the media are exclusively engaged in neutral dissemination of ideas or
information originated by others, imposing liability would have a significant
chilling effect on the broad dissemination of First Amendment-protected
380. See Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835-38.
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speech. At present, courts have been protecting media defendants in this
posture with common law negligence analyses, often infused with First
Amendment principles. 381 However, it cannot be certain that all courts will
continue to extend such common law protection in the future, and some com-
mentators have urged that they should not.382
Summarizing, then, three different factors potentially favoring First
Amendment protection for the media defendant - the Speech
Dissemination/Liability Factor, the Content Categorization Factor, and the
Chilling Effects Factor - are to be weighed at the Second Level of the bal-
ancing test against the state's interest in compensating tort victims suffering
physical injury, wrongful death, or emotional distress.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the media physical injury cases, most courts have sensed that some
constitutional protection was appropriate, and have analogized the problem to
two different areas of-First Amendment jurisprudence - the clear and pre-
sent danger test of Brandenburg and the defamation distinction regarding
matters that are or are not "of public concern" in the Gertz and Greenmoss
cases.
These analogies are of limited usefulness: the Brandenburg model is
needlessly over-protective of the media while the GertzIGreenmoss model
would be dangerously under-protective. Moreover, these analogies have led
the courts into an exclusive and narrow focus on the content of the subject
speech which, while not incorrect or irrelevant in and of itself, has obscured
the important, unifying First Amendment interest that was at stake in almost
a13 of these cases. That interest is the need to protect the media and media-
related enterprises when, in playing their important First Amendment role as
the disseminators and magnifiers of speech, they face potentially conflicting
common law negligence principles which would expand both the scope of the
duty and the potential plaintiff class as the audience increases.384
Using Judge Learned Hand's clear and present danger formulation in
Dennis v. United States, this Article proposes a calibrated balancing test for
use in the media physical injury cases. It is designed to take into account the
"speech dissemination/liability factor" as well as other factors, including
speech content, which are properly considered in drawing an appropriate bal-
ance between the First Amendment interest in protecting the functional role of
the media and the states' interests in providing damage remedies for injured
parties.
381. See discussion supra notes 14-29 & 148-61 and accompanying text.
382. See, e.g., Diamond & Primm, supra note 4.
383. Again, the Endangering Revelation cases, such as Hyde and Times Mirror, do not
fit this pattern. See discussion supra Part IV(b)(2).
384. See discussion supra Part 111(b).
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